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    The Existence of God: an argument against belief in God

    If science can explain religious belief, does that explain God away? The cognitive science of religion

    This argument holds that belief in God comes from mental processes that evolved for other purposes and do not reliably track unseen agents, so the belief is unjustified. Liz Goodnick and Matthew Braddock have defended versions of it. Critics answer that it would discredit too much, that believers have other reasons, and that God may have worked through them.

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    The argument, step by step

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Belief in God is explained by natural mental processes that evolved for other purposes.
    2. Premise 2These processes are off-track: they were not shaped to find the truth about unseen agents.
    3. ConclusionSo belief in God formed in this way is not justified.

    1Premise 1Belief in God is explained by natural mental processes that evolved for other purposes.

    What both sides acceptJason Marsh, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry, who with Jon Marsh has also proposed a challenge to theism (see the conclusion), describes two main kinds of evolutionary explanation of religion. On by-product accounts, associated with Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett, who is himself a theist, belief in gods and spirits arises as a side effect of mental tools that evolved for other jobs. This is the traditional framework of the cognitive science of religion, a field that studies how the workings of the mind shape religious ideas. On adaptation accounts, belief in watchful, moralizing gods helped large groups cooperate, as in Ara Norenzayan's Big Gods proposal; Norenzayan now joins this to the by-product view, and accounts that combine the two are on the rise.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentA tendency to see agents everywhere

    In the simplest version of the argument, which Marsh sets out, belief in unseen agents comes from a tendency to read ambiguous sounds and movements as the work of an agent, even when no one is there. Some researchers call it a hypersensitive agency detection device.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentAgency detection cannot explain it all

    Michael Murray argues that agency detection, even if it lies at the root of religion, is unlikely to give a complete account of religious belief. Marsh adds that the agency detection device is itself controversial: researchers have criticized it, along with other ideas in the field, though such criticisms are often met with responses or revised proposals.1

    Reply, for the argumentWiden the list of causes

    Liz Goodnick widens the list of causes beyond agency detection, while staying within the by-product view, and argues that the science can, without assuming atheism, raise real doubts about God and about whether belief in God is reliably formed. Marsh suggests adding causes such as believing in order to belong, and asking whether these put people in touch with religious reality or only help them survive.1

    Against the argumentThe science of religion's origins is unsettled

    Paul Thagard, writing in 2005, doubted that evolutionary explanations of how religion began could succeed without a dramatic increase in historical and biological knowledge of human evolution. Other critics judge the whole approach too Abrahamic, atheistic, reductionist, or Western.1

    Against the argumentBelievers may have other reasons

    Joshua Thurow argues that some believers have grounds for belief that do not depend on the processes the science describes, such as arguments for God or testimony, and Kelly James Clark and Barrett point to religious experience as another. Such grounds make it harder for a debunking argument to apply. By analogy, Marsh writes, a fan who has heard the star herself say she likes her may be justified, even if she has trusted tabloids before.1

    Reply, for the argumentThose reasons may not be independent

    Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt question whether arguments for God are truly independent of the causes the science describes. Thurow, who denies that debunking arguments fully undermine religious belief, grants that if the science predicts that believers rationalize, awareness of this could call for some reduction in confidence, and Lari Launonen, who also holds that some believers have independent reasons, grants that some ordinary religious experiences may be undercut.1

    2Premise 2These processes are off-track: they were not shaped to find the truth about unseen agents.

    What both sides acceptMarsh frames the question with two cases. A fan who believes that a pop star likes her because a highly unreliable tabloid said so seems to have reason for doubt once she learns where her belief came from; a fan who believes she is watching the star on stage loses nothing by learning that human eyesight evolved. Whether religious belief is more like the first case or the second, he writes, remains controversial.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentBetter safe than sorry means many false alarms

    As is often stated, Marsh writes, agency detection is a better-safe-than-sorry mechanism, so it produces many false positives: it may detect bears well enough, but it is far less likely to be accurate about unseen agents with supernatural powers.1

    For the argumentBelievers who reject most gods may be more exposed to doubt

    Marsh suggests that believers who accept these explanations, and who think that most supernatural agents ever believed in do not exist, may find it a live possibility that they would believe largely as they do even if no gods, God, or karmic realities existed.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe argument would discredit too much

    One natural way of stating this premise, Marsh writes, assumes that knowledge requires sensitivity: had the belief been false, one would not have held it. Contemporary epistemologists tend to reject that requirement, he reports, partly because it would also cast doubt on the belief that we live in a physical world. Roger White argues that objections which dismiss a belief by pointing to its causes rest on implausible assumptions; since all our faculties have natural origins, Guy Kahane warns, such arguments could overgeneralize, and Justin Clarke-Doane argues that accepting debunking arguments against objective moral facts could put mathematical beliefs in jeopardy. Max Baker-Hytch argues that religious versions share the difficulties of the moral and mathematical ones.1

    Reply, for the argumentRecast the argument

    Defenders sometimes use more widely accepted principles, such as safety: one knows something only if one could not easily have believed it falsely, though not everyone agrees that knowledge requires safety. Matthew Braddock offers a debunking argument from false beliefs: since the same mental tools produce so many different god beliefs, the whole class of god beliefs calls for suspending judgment.1

    Against the argumentGod exists necessarily

    Some theists, such as Murray, give a metaphysical reply: since God is a necessary being, existing in every possible world, asking what people would believe if God did not exist is confused. Murray writes that he does not think there would be a universe if there were no God.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe challenge is about knowledge

    Marsh replies that this answer arguably misreads a challenge that is about knowledge, not about what exists: what is possible for all we know can lead a person to revise views about what must exist.1

    3ConclusionSo belief in God formed in this way is not justified.

    What both sides acceptThe conclusion concerns whether belief in God is justified, not whether God exists. Marsh reports widespread agreement on two points in the philosophical literature: uncovering the origins of a belief does not by itself show that it is false, a mistake some call the genetic fallacy; yet under the right circumstances, uncovering those origins may still pose a problem for the belief.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentWhy would God design minds that produce rival faiths?

    Jason Marsh and Jon Marsh argue that the science raises a new challenge for theism: if God cares about the details of what people believe, why would God design human minds and settings so that many competing traditions naturally arise? Some theists, Jason Marsh notes, might find the question puzzling, and some might find it significant as evidence.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentGod may have planned this path

    Many theist scientists, including Barrett, seek to fold the science's findings into their religious worldview: just as some hold that natural processes such as random mutation may still be guided by God, one may hold that God planned this pathway for religion. Peter van Inwagen holds that the science may be read this way. Some natural explanations resist it, he grants, as when a statue's apparent tears turn out to be bat urine, but he denies that most current scientific accounts of religion do.1

    Reply, for the argumentPeople may combine explanations too freely

    Marsh asks whether people's actual habit of combining natural and supernatural explanations, which can look highly fallible from a scientific point of view, is more like the bat case than van Inwagen allows. Many scientists and philosophers find such combined accounts unnecessary, he adds.1

    Reply, against the argumentThe question is whether the science rules such accounts out

    Marsh notes that the question is whether the science strictly rules such accounts out, and reports that even some well-known atheists deny that the science of religion is atheistic by nature: the spell Daniel Dennett sought to break in his book Breaking the Spell was not religion itself but the idea that religion cannot be studied scientifically.1

    Where does the argument come from?

    Natural explanations of religion are ancient, but the science behind this argument, and the argument itself, are recent.1 Marsh notes earlier attempts to explain religion in natural terms by Xenophanes, Epicurus, and David Hume.1 Helen De Cruz, in another Stanford Encyclopedia entry, traces the scientific study of religion to natural histories such as Bernard de Fontenelle's De l'origine des fables (1724), which held that people see more miracles the less they understand natural causes.2 Hume's The Natural History of Religion (1757) traced polytheism, which he took to be the earliest form of religion, to ignorance of natural causes combined with fear.2

    In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new sciences of anthropology, sociology, and psychology looked for natural roots of religion; the sociologist Emile Durkheim, for example, argued in 1912 that religious beliefs are a social glue that holds societies together.2 From the 1920s, anthropologists such as Edward Evans-Pritchard argued that religious beliefs were not simply the result of ignorance of natural causes, and psychologists and sociologists of religion began to doubt that such beliefs were rooted in irrationality or illness.2

    Works in the cognitive science of religion that Marsh cites include Stewart Guthrie's cognitive theory of religion (1980), Boyer's Religion Explained (2001), and Barrett's Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004); in 2020 the field's international association renamed itself to include the evolutionary sciences.1 Arguments that try to show a belief unjustified by exposing how it was formed are called debunking arguments.1 The form used on this page, for which Marsh cites Kahane (2011), first arose in debates about evolution and morality and has since been applied to religion.1

    Across traditions

    Marsh notes that the debate has centered on theism, including the idea of God as a perfect being and various Christian theological ideas, and that work on other traditions has begun, such as Tiddy Smith's common consent argument for nature spirits.1 The argument could reach belief in karmic realities as well as belief in gods or God, Marsh notes, yet the works this page draws on give no Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, or Latter-day Saint reply to it.1

    Christianity. In Christian theology, the science bears on the sense of the divine (sensus divinitatis) that the Protestant Reformer John Calvin described, which Alvin Plantinga defines as a disposition to form beliefs about God in certain circumstances.34 Tyler Greenway and Barrett write that the science gives evidence that humans, as groups if not as individuals, are naturally drawn to ideas consistent with the broad outline of this teaching, such as purpose in nature and gods who may care about morality.3 Whether these natural leanings match any particular theology of the sense of the divine, they add, is an open question.3 The capacities the science studies may lead to belief in some creator, they note, but may not lead to a specific God, since further details may vary by culture; and some Christian teachings, such as the Trinity, may run against intuition.3

    Islam. Aria Nakissa argues that Islamic theology, including ideas from al-Ghazali (about 1056 to 1111), can accommodate key concepts of the cognitive science of religion.15

    Where does the debate stand?

    Goodnick and Goldman press challenges to belief in God drawn from the science, and Braddock has offered one, though in later work he gives an evidential argument for theism drawn from the same science; Murray, Thurow, and van Inwagen answer such challenges.1 For most theorists in the field, Marsh writes, the science of religion describes how religion arises, and its wider implications are a separate, philosophical matter; theist scientists such as Barrett contribute to it.1 Marsh suggests that the answer may lie somewhere between full defeat and no problem at all, and doubts that debunking arguments will go away anytime soon.1

    Common questions

    What is the cognitive science of religion?

    It is a field, drawing on psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and other disciplines, that studies how ordinary mental processes shape religious thought. Researchers such as Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett propose that belief in gods arises partly as a side effect of tools such as agency detection, while Ara Norenzayan holds that belief in moralizing gods helped large groups cooperate.

    Does explaining where a belief comes from show that it is false?

    Not by itself, on the widespread view that Jason Marsh reports in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. But a belief's origins may still pose a problem for it, as with a belief taken from an unreliable tabloid. The debate is over whether religious belief is more like that case or like ordinary perception, where learning that eyesight evolved changes nothing.

    How do theists answer this argument?

    Some, such as Michael Murray, hold that asking what people would believe if God did not exist is confused, since God exists necessarily. Others argue that believers have independent reasons, such as arguments or religious experience, or that God may have planned the natural path by which religion arose. Theist scientists such as Justin Barrett seek to incorporate the findings.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Jason Marsh. Evolutionary Approaches to Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Helen De Cruz. Religion and Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Tyler Greenway and Justin L. Barrett. Theology and the Cognitive Science of Religion. St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. R. Ward Holder. John Calvin (1509 to 1564). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, title line. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    5. Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.