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    The Existence of God: an argument for God

    Do minds point to God? Arguments from consciousness and reason

    Arguments from mind hold that consciousness and reasoning fit better with God than with naturalism. Richard Swinburne and J. P. Moreland argue that conscious minds are evidence for God; C. S. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga argue that naturalism undermines trust in reason. Critics, among them Graham Oppy, John F. Post, and the Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, question each step.

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    The argument from consciousness: is the mind evidence for God?

    This argument holds that conscious experience is better explained if God exists than if nature is all there is. Its defenders here are Richard Swinburne and J. P. Moreland; its critics include Graham Oppy, who defends naturalism.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Humans have conscious mental states, such as sensations, thoughts, and intentions, that are not physical states.
    2. Premise 2These states are regularly correlated with particular brain states, and science is very unlikely ever to explain why.
    3. ConclusionTherefore, God explains consciousness better than natural causes alone do, and consciousness is evidence for God.

    1Premise 1Humans have conscious mental states, such as sensations, thoughts, and intentions, that are not physical states.

    For the argument

    For the argumentMental states are not physical states

    Richard Swinburne holds that humans are essentially souls, with "a rich mental life of sensations, thoughts, intentions, and other pure mental events." J. P. Moreland argues that our own awareness of consciousness attests that mental states are nonphysical.12

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe case against physicalism rests on disputed intuitions

    David Papineau, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on naturalism, writes that the case against physicalism about consciousness has the backing of intuition, but that whether the intuition can be made into a sound argument is highly controversial. A majority of contemporary philosophers, he judges, probably hold that physicalism can resist such arguments, while a significant minority take the other side.3

    2Premise 2These states are regularly correlated with particular brain states, and science is very unlikely ever to explain why.

    What both sides acceptScientific knowledge of the brain and its close connection with consciousness has grown rapidly; damage to the brain, for example, alters states of consciousness. Philosophers call the difficulty of explaining how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience the hard problem of consciousness, a phrase made familiar by David Chalmers.4

    For the argument

    For the argumentNo scientific law could explain why this soul goes with this body

    Swinburne argues that the causal links between mental and brain events require an enormous number of separate laws joining the mental to the physical. Since each soul is the particular soul it is apart from its properties, he holds, no scientific law could explain why this soul, rather than another possible one, was created and joined to this body.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentMind and brain may be one state grasped in two ways

    Materialists, who hold that the mind is physical, answer that two concepts can pick out one thing, as "water" and "H2O" do, Rocco J. Gennaro writes. A conscious state may be a brain state grasped through first-person concepts or through those of brain science; if so, the link only seems arbitrary, and science will be able, in principle, to solve the hard problem.4

    Against the argumentThe gap may lie in our concepts, not in nature

    Colin McGinn argues that humans are "cognitively closed" to how the brain produces conscious experience, much as a dog cannot understand calculus. He holds that some brain property does produce experience, and he does not give up materialism: what we lack are the concepts to grasp it.4

    Reply, for the argumentMcGinn's view should give way to the argument from consciousness

    Moreland's 2008 book examines McGinn's view among five rival accounts of consciousness and argues that each should be rejected in favor of the argument from consciousness.5

    3ConclusionTherefore, God explains consciousness better than natural causes alone do, and consciousness is evidence for God.

    What both sides acceptThe argument is offered as evidence, not proof: it holds that consciousness, or its regular link with physical states, is better explained by a personal cause than by a natural one.52

    For the argument

    For the argumentGod has reason to create souls and link them to brains

    Swinburne argues that the laws linking mental to brain events would be most improbable if God had not made them, and that God has reason to create humans, who can choose between good and evil, a kind of goodness God himself does not have. Moreland argues that nonphysical mental states are better explained by a personal, theistic cause than by a natural, scientific one.152

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA mind beyond physics need not come from God

    Among philosophers who hold that consciousness goes beyond the physical, Papineau reports, an increasingly popular view is Russellian monism, which places conscious properties among the basic properties that underlie the roles physics describes. Another is panpsychism, the view that even the smallest physical things have some mental properties.34

    Reply, for the argumentPanpsychism should be rejected along with the other rivals

    Moreland examines David Skrbina's panpsychism, along with the views of John Searle, Timothy O'Connor, and Philip Clayton, and argues that it too should be rejected.5

    Against the argumentNaturalism's difficulties may not point to theism

    Alan Rhoda, reviewing a separate debate between Moreland and Oppy in a volume of newly commissioned essays, finds Moreland less convincing in explaining how naturalism's difficulties point specifically to theism. Oppy argues that the theoretical virtues, the marks of a good explanation, strongly favor his version of naturalism over Moreland's theism.2

    Reply, for the argumentOppy's naturalism ends up denying qualia

    Rhoda notes that Oppy ends up holding that qualia do not exist, though humans still have rich conscious mental lives. Qualia are perhaps most often understood as the felt qualities of conscious states, but philosophers disagree over their nature and even their existence. Rhoda finds Oppy's view puzzling, and Oppy's appeal to the theoretical virtues unconvincing.24

    The argument from reason: can nature alone produce reasoning?

    C. S. Lewis argued in his book Miracles (1947) that naturalism, the view that nothing exists but nature, undermines itself. Elizabeth Anscombe, a Catholic philosopher who also rejected naturalism, criticized the argument in 1948, and Lewis rewrote it for the book's second edition (1960).

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1If naturalism is true, every belief is fully explained by earlier physical events and the laws of physics.
    2. Premise 2A belief fully explained in that way is not based on reasoning.
    3. ConclusionSo belief in naturalism itself would not be based on reasoning, and naturalism undermines itself.
    4. Beyond natureSince reasoning does happen, something beyond nature exists.

    1Premise 1If naturalism is true, every belief is fully explained by earlier physical events and the laws of physics.

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentNatural causes are non-rational, not irrational

    Elizabeth Anscombe, who agreed with Lewis that naturalism is untenable, objected that he called all natural causes "irrational." They are non-rational, she argued, and thought produced by non-rational causes need not be doubted on that account; doubt is in place only when a particular cause known to produce unreasonable beliefs is at work. She also pressed Lewis on what he meant by "valid" reasoning.67

    Reply, for the argumentLewis accepted both points and rebuilt the argument

    Lewis granted both criticisms in a note printed with her paper, calling "valid" a bad word for what he meant. For the 1960 edition he rewrote the chapter as "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism," dropped "irrational," and distinguished two senses of "because": cause and effect, and ground and consequent, the link between a reason and what it supports.6

    Reply, against the argumentThe revision still leaves the central question open

    Writing in 1981, Anscombe judged the revised chapter a real improvement, which recognized the depth of the problem, but still saw much to criticize. Lewis never explored, she held, what it would be for an act of knowing to be determined solely by what is known, and the question of how grounds connect with the actual occurrence of a belief had no answer yet.6

    Reply, for the argumentThe revised argument survives Anscombe's objections

    Victor Reppert argued in a 1989 dissertation that Anscombe's objections, while effective against the first edition, fail to refute the revised argument, and he has since defended a reformulated version.89

    2Premise 2A belief fully explained in that way is not based on reasoning.

    For the argument

    For the argumentKnowing must be shaped by the truth it knows

    In the revised chapter, Arend Smilde notes, Lewis holds that an act of knowing must be determined by the truth it knows, which is impossible if naturalism is true. He then examines three naturalist accounts of reasoning: as a product of natural selection, of experience, or of daily practice.6

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA belief can have causes and still rest on reasons

    Peter van Inwagen, himself a convert to Christianity, argued in 2011 that Lewis's revised argument fails to show that naturalism leaves no belief based on reasoning. As Marek Peplinski summarizes him, the argument relies on an unjustified thesis: that explaining a belief by its causes and explaining it by reasoning exclude each other.101112

    Reply, for the argumentLewis's point is that naturalism leaves no room for insight

    Peplinski answers that van Inwagen did not show that thesis to be Lewis's premise. Lewis allows the two kinds of explanation to fit together, he argues, but holds that naturalism leaves no room for the insights that are part of reasoning.11

    3ConclusionSo belief in naturalism itself would not be based on reasoning, and naturalism undermines itself.

    For the argument

    For the argumentNaturalism cannot be held for good reasons

    In the first edition, Lewis held that naturalism would be "a proof that there are no such things as proofs." As Peplinski puts it, naturalism should be accepted by reasoning if it is to count as rational, and naturalism itself seems to rule that out.611

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentMany hold that Anscombe's critique undermined the argument

    Lewis's argument, Reppert reports, is widely thought to have been undermined by Anscombe's criticisms, and it is sometimes said that the exchange weakened Lewis as an apologist, a writer who defends a faith by argument.9

    4Beyond natureSince reasoning does happen, something beyond nature exists.

    For the argument

    For the argumentReasoning is a fact in need of explanation

    In the revision, Smilde argues, Lewis treats reasoning as a fact to be explained, the form Reppert recommends: an argument to the best explanation. Lewis concludes that reason is our starting point.6

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentReasoning has no causes, natural or otherwise

    Anscombe's argument, as Smilde reads it, is that we cannot posit causes beyond nature for rationality, because we cannot posit any causes for rationality at all. On that view, this case for something outside nature falls to the ground.6

    Reply, for the argumentThen rationality is not a natural thing

    Smilde replies that by stressing that rationality has no causes, Anscombe only strengthens Lewis's conviction that it is not a natural thing.6

    Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism

    Alvin Plantinga argues that naturalism combined with evolution undermines itself. The argument targets that combination, not evolution: Plantinga accepts evolution, and holds that the conflict lies between science and naturalism, not between science and religion.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Given naturalism and evolution, the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or cannot be estimated.
    2. Premise 2A person who accepts naturalism and evolution, and sees this, has a defeater: a reason to doubt that their faculties are reliable.
    3. Premise 3That doubt extends to every belief the faculties produce, including belief in naturalism and evolution.
    4. ConclusionSo one cannot rationally accept both naturalism and evolution.

    1Premise 1Given naturalism and evolution, the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or cannot be estimated.

    For the argument

    For the argumentSelection works on behavior, not on truth

    Natural selection works on behavior, Plantinga argues, and on materialism a belief affects behavior through its brain properties, not through its content, what it says, whether true or false. So, given naturalism and evolution, the probability that our faculties are reliable is low, or at least inscrutable: impossible to estimate.13

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentTrue beliefs are what help creatures succeed

    William Ramsey argues that the best explanation of how creatures find food, avoid predators, and find mates is that they have accurate beliefs. Jerry Fodor sets out a plausible history in which minds were selected because they produced, by and large, true beliefs that helped creatures survive.13

    Reply, for the argumentOnly if a belief's content can cause behavior

    Plantinga answers that true beliefs could help creatures survive only if a belief's content plays a part in causing behavior. Attempts to show how it could, he holds, "have unanimously come to grief."13

    Reply, against the argumentAn account of how content causes behavior exists

    John F. Post, reviewing the exchange in 2002, answers that Ruth Millikan has given a rigorous account of how a belief's content, and even its truth, can play a part in causing behavior. Plantinga and his critics, he notes, do not discuss it.13

    2Premise 2A person who accepts naturalism and evolution, and sees this, has a defeater: a reason to doubt that their faculties are reliable.

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWe may trust our faculties without argument

    Michael Bergmann, drawing on Thomas Reid, argues that the belief that our faculties are reliable can be justified without being inferred from anything, as a belief of common sense. Ernest Sosa argues that any view of our own powers of knowing raises problems of circularity, and that these problems are not peculiar to naturalism.13

    Reply, for the argumentA story of reliability does not remove the doubt

    Plantinga agrees that we believe our faculties reliable without argument, and with good warrant, but holds that the naturalist still has a defeater. The naturalist can tell a story on which the faculties are reliable, he writes, but the defeater "can't be sidestepped" that way.13

    Against the argumentA low or unknown probability need not defeat a belief

    Trenton Merricks points out that a low or unknown probability does not in general give a defeater, unless something explains why it does in this case. William Alston argues that the case for a low probability is poorly supported, and that if the probability is inscrutable instead, its bearing on a defeater is unclear.13

    Reply, for the argumentFaculties built for survival are not aimed at truth

    Plantinga answers that warrant requires faculties aimed at producing true beliefs. If undirected evolution produced ours, their purpose, if they have one, would be to produce beliefs that enhance fitness, the ability to survive and reproduce, not true beliefs. Alston allows that Plantinga could still argue that a person who holds both views cannot stay rational without doubting their faculties, and Plantinga replies that this is the heart of what he is after.13

    Against the argumentOther information makes reliability likely

    Timothy O'Connor and Richard Otte argue that the naturalist may take further information into account, such as the design of our faculties or our experience, which makes their reliability likely.13

    Reply, for the argumentOnce the doubt arises, more experience cannot remove it

    Plantinga grants that there is a real question about which information to take into account, but holds that once the defeater is in place, further experience does not change that.13

    3Premise 3That doubt extends to every belief the faculties produce, including belief in naturalism and evolution.

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWhy should the doubt spread to everything?

    James Van Cleve asks why a reason to doubt our faculties should become a reason to doubt every belief, and what general principle, not made up for the case, would support that step. William Talbott argues that our faculties may judge themselves reliable on all the evidence, and that Plantinga praises a rigid way of thinking that is far from desirable.13

    Reply, for the argumentA doubt about the source covers what it produces

    Plantinga gives the principle: whoever has an undefeated reason to doubt that a source of belief is reliable has a reason to doubt every belief they think comes only from that source. Since the doubt covers all of a person's faculties, he answers Talbott, it also covers any belief that might be used to remove it.13

    4ConclusionSo one cannot rationally accept both naturalism and evolution.

    What both sides acceptPlantinga accepts the scientific theory of evolution and holds that, rightly understood, it does not conflict with theistic religion. His argument concludes that naturalism and evolution cannot both be rationally accepted; he thinks naturalism is the belief at fault, Robert Deltete notes, but he does not offer a proof of it.14

    For the argument

    For the argumentThe conflict is between science and naturalism

    Plantinga holds that the combination of naturalism and evolution is "in a certain interesting way self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent." On his view, the conflict lies not between science and religion, but between science and naturalism.1315

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentAn argument from gaps that may yet close

    Post calls Plantinga's strategy an anti-naturalism of the gaps, not a God of the gaps: point to a stubborn gap in naturalist explanation, argue that it will probably never close, and offer a theistic explanation. In the past, he answers, such gaps in the science that naturalism draws on were eventually closed or shown to be spurious, and naturalism continues to progress.13

    Where does the argument come from?

    All three arguments took their present forms in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.6155 C. S. Lewis set out the argument from reason in chapter 3 of Miracles (1947), titled in the first edition "The Self-Contradiction of the Naturalist."6 Neither Lewis nor Anscombe used the phrase "argument from reason," which Smilde thinks may not yet have been current in their day.6 Anscombe (1919 to 2001) read her reply to the Oxford University Socratic Club on February 2, 1948, with Lewis present.76 Accounts of the evening vary, and in later years Lewis and Anscombe were each reported, by Walter Hooper, to have said that they had won.76 The new edition of Miracles, with the chapter rewritten, came out in May 1960.6

    Alvin Plantinga first formulated his evolutionary argument against naturalism in 1993.15 James Beilby edited a volume of eleven critical essays on it, with Plantinga's replies, which Post reviewed in 2002.13 Plantinga restated the argument in Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011), a defense of Christian theism whose main thesis is that science and theistic religion conflict only on the surface and agree at a deep level, while science and naturalism agree on the surface and conflict deeply.14 Swinburne argued from consciousness to God in his book The Existence of God, and again in a 2015 article, "The argument from souls to God"; Moreland made his case at book length in Consciousness and the Existence of God (2008).1615 Chad Meister's survey of the philosophy of religion groups arguments from the rise of consciousness with design arguments from living things, and reports that they have not generally received as much attention as the fine-tuning argument.17

    Across traditions

    Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim philosophers developed their own accounts of consciousness and the self, and Latter-day Saint teaching holds its own view of where minds come from.18192021 No Jewish response to these arguments appears in the works this page cites.

    Buddhism. Buddhist philosophy gives a detailed account of the mind without an enduring self.19 Buddhists, Christian Coseru writes, do not tie mental life to a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent; the doctrine of not-self (anatta) holds that human beings are reducible to the physical and psychological parts and processes that make them up.19 The tradition describes a person as five aggregates, from the body and its sensations to consciousness itself, and consciousness arises in dependence on the senses, as one link in the chain of dependent arising.19 The Buddhist analysis of matter, Coseru notes, does not imply physicalism, the view that everything is physical or depends on the physical.19 Buddhism in its main forms involves no belief in God.22

    Christianity. Christian writers developed the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument against naturalism, and Christian philosophers also stand among the critics.914712 Lewis wrote as a Christian apologist, and Deltete describes Plantinga's 2011 book as a vigorous defense of theism, specifically Christian theism.92314 Among the critics, Anscombe was a convert to Roman Catholicism, van Inwagen was baptized as an adult, in 1983, and Alston, who had returned to Christian faith by the mid-1970s, helped found the Society of Christian Philosophers.712

    Hinduism. Hindu schools place consciousness near the center of reality and argue over its nature.2425 Nyaya philosophers argued that desire, cognition, pleasure, pain, and will are qualities that must belong to some substance, and that since no material element, such as earth or water, bears them, there must be a non-material self; the body, made of material elements, cannot be the basic seat of conscious states.18 Nyaya counts God, too, as a self, a unique one.18

    All schools of Vedanta, Shyam Ranganathan writes, hold that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is of the nature of consciousness and knowledge.24 In Advaita Vedanta, the non-dual school of Shankara, Brahman is pure existence, pure consciousness, and pure bliss, and consciousness is not a property of Brahman but its very nature.25 Followers of the devotional (bhakti) paths, John Carman writes, hold that ultimate reality is personal, a being who both transcends the universe and creates it, whom Vaishnavas know as Vishnu, Shaivas as Shiva, and Shaktas as the Goddess.26 Ramanuja (traditionally dated 1017 to 1137), the leading philosopher of the Sri Vaishnava community, held that consciousness is always consciousness of some object, and that it is itself a property, not, as Advaita teaches, the very being of Brahman; he held, too, that individual selves are real and distinct.24

    Islam. Avicenna (Ibn Sina, about 980 to 1037) devised a famous thought experiment: a person suspended in the air, cut off from all physical and sensory experience.2720 Its purpose, Alfred Ivry writes, is to show that a person can know by intellect alone, without the senses, that the soul exists.20 Avicenna took the experiment to establish that the soul is an independent intelligent substance, which outlasts the bodily organs that serve it.20 Like the first premise of the argument from consciousness, it holds that the self is not physical; its conclusion concerns the soul.20

    The Latter-day Saint faith. Joseph Smith taught, in a sermon that the philosopher David L. Paulsen quotes, that God did not create the human mind in the beginning, and that humans exist on the same principles as God, a self-existent being.28 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teaches that God is the Father of each human spirit, while "the light or intelligence at the core of each human soul" was never created (Doctrine and Covenants 93:29).2129 In this teaching, God is the Father of human spirits but not the maker of the intelligence at their core.2128

    Where does the debate stand?

    Each of the three arguments has defenders and critics writing today.21114 Swinburne and Moreland defend the argument from consciousness, and Oppy answers it from naturalism.12 Reppert and Peplinski defend Lewis's revised argument, while van Inwagen holds that it fails.91110 Plantinga defends his argument against critics including Merricks and Alston, and Post, reviewing the exchange, presses an objection of his own.13

    Common questions

    What is the argument from consciousness?

    It holds that conscious experience is better explained if God exists than if nature is all there is. Richard Swinburne argues that the laws linking mental events to brain events would be most improbable unless God made them, and that God has reason to create humans. Critics such as Graham Oppy argue that naturalism remains the better explanation.

    Did Elizabeth Anscombe refute C. S. Lewis's argument from reason?

    Accounts differ. In 1948 Anscombe argued that Lewis wrongly called natural causes irrational, and Lewis granted her points and rewrote his chapter for the 1960 edition of Miracles. Victor Reppert holds that the revised argument survives her objections; Peter van Inwagen argues that it still fails. Arend Smilde concludes that neither won, while both gained.

    Does Plantinga's argument reject evolution?

    No. Alvin Plantinga accepts the scientific theory of evolution. His argument targets naturalism combined with evolution: if both are true, he argues, the probability that our minds are reliable is low or cannot be estimated, so a naturalist who accepts evolution has reason to doubt all their beliefs, naturalism included.

    Read next

    Sources

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    2. Alan R. Rhoda. Review of J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2015. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. David Papineau. Naturalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020. Accessed 2026-11-20.
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