The Existence of God: an argument against God
Does the world need God to explain it? Naturalism and simplicity
The case from naturalism and simplicity holds that nature explains the world as well as God does, with fewer kinds of things, so naturalism is the better explanation. Graham Oppy and Paul Draper defend it. Critics such as Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga answer that God is the simpler explanation, or that belief in God can be reasonable without argument.
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The argument, step by step
This map combines the steps of the argument as Graham Oppy, Paul Draper, and Antony Flew each set them out.
The argument, as its defenders state it:
- Premise 1Of two explanations that fit the evidence equally well, prefer the one that posits fewer kinds of things.
- Premise 2Naturalism posits one kind of reality and causation, the natural; theism posits two, the natural and the supernatural.
- Premise 3Naturalism explains the evidence at least as well as theism.
- ConclusionTherefore, naturalism is the better explanation of the world.
- The burden of proofWithout good evidence for God, the reasonable stance is not to believe in God.
1Premise 1Of two explanations that fit the evidence equally well, prefer the one that posits fewer kinds of things.
What both sides acceptBoth sides appeal to this principle of simplicity, often called Ockham's razor; Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Isaac Newton, and Immanuel Kant all stated versions of it, and Swinburne's case for God rests on simplicity too. The principle applies only when rival explanations account for the facts equally well, which the biologist Kent Holsinger notes is rare.12
For the argument
For the argumentA cause that explains nothing extra should be dropped
Antoine Lavoisier argued that if all of chemistry can be explained without phlogiston, the supposed substance very likely does not exist. Aquinas stated the parallel objection to belief in God: if nature accounts for natural things, and human reason or will for deliberate acts, there seems no need to suppose that God exists.13
Reply, against the argumentNature itself points to a first cause
Aquinas answers his own objection: nature works toward ends under the direction of a higher agent, so what nature does must be traced back to God as its first cause. Human reason and will can change and fail, so they too must be traced to an unchanging first principle.3
Against the argument
The sources used give no point here.
2Premise 2Naturalism posits one kind of reality and causation, the natural; theism posits two, the natural and the supernatural.
What both sides acceptNaturalism in this argument means ontological naturalism, the view that reality contains nothing supernatural. It differs from methodological naturalism, the rule that science explains by natural causes alone, which makes no claim about whether anything beyond nature exists.45
For the argument
For the argumentTheism doubles every kind of thing
Graham Oppy argues that theism is committed to two kinds of entities, two kinds of causation, and two kinds of properties, natural and supernatural, where naturalism needs only one of each. If both views fit the evidence equally well and cover the same ground, naturalism is simpler.2
For the argumentTheism is a very specific claim
Paul Draper holds that source physicalism, the view that the physical world came first and gave rise to minds, starts out as probable as its mirror image, on which mind came first. Theism adds risky specifics to the second: one mind, all-powerful, all-knowing, eternal, and morally perfect. So it starts out far less probable.6
Against the argument
Against the argumentGod is the simpler explanation
Richard Swinburne argues that theism posits one being of one kind, a person whose power, knowledge, and freedom have no limits, and that infinite degrees are simpler than any precise finite amount. On his view, a simple God is more probable from the start than a complex universe existing with no explanation.2
Reply, for the argumentA person is not simple
J. L. Mackie answers that acting on intentions depends on complex systems of brain and body, and that once these are counted, the simplicity of a personal explanation disappears.2
Reply, against the argumentIntentions explain without the machinery
Swinburne replies that the simple link between an intention and its fulfillment has nothing to do with how intentions are carried out in practice. A God without a body can act on intentions directly, with no physical steps in between.2
Reply, for the argumentFewer parts need not mean simpler
John Ostrowick argues that an explanation with ten factors can be simpler than one with four, if the relations among the ten are simpler.2
Reply, against the argumentExplaining the whole universe is a special case
Bruce Reichenbach, the Stanford entry's author, suggests that Swinburne could grant the point but answer that in such limited cases, explanatory power, background knowledge, and scope come into play in a way they do not when explaining the oddness, size, and complexity of the universe.2
3Premise 3Naturalism explains the evidence at least as well as theism.
What both sides acceptIn a 2009 Pew Research Center survey of members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 33 percent said they believe in God, 18 percent in a universal spirit or higher power, and 41 percent in neither. In Pew's 2006 survey of the US public, the figures were 83, 12, and 4 percent. Pew notes that AAAS members may not represent all US scientists.7
For the argument
For the argumentThe success of science may count as evidence for naturalism
Draper argues that the success of methodological naturalism could be evidence for ontological naturalism: a method that looks only for natural causes has kept on succeeding.5
Reply, against the argumentA working method says nothing beyond itself
Many philosophers of religion deny that methodological naturalism, a rule for doing science, implies atheism or agnosticism. On their view, a believer can practice science exactly as a nonbeliever does and remain a believer.4
For the argumentThe details fit naturalism better
Draper argues that natural theologians cite general facts and overlook more specific ones. The world's complexity arises from a much simpler early universe and a small number of kinds of particles, and conscious minds depend closely on the brain. These details are what one would expect if the physical came first, he argues, but theism gives no reason to expect them.6
Against the argument
Against the argumentGod is not a rival to natural causes
C. Stephen Evans and David Baggett argue that God is not one more cause within the natural world but the reason there are natural causes at all, so a natural explanation can never rule out a theistic one. William Carroll, building on Aquinas, holds that God is not a cause in the way creatures are causes, competing with natural causes, and needs no gaps in nature in order to act.85
Against the argumentNaturalism leaves the universe itself unexplained
Swinburne argues that science cannot explain why there is a universe at all or why its basic laws hold, so naturalism must take the universe as a brute fact. Theism offers a personal explanation: God would have reasons to make an ordered universe with beings who can understand it.2
Reply, for the argumentThe universe may need no explanation
Bertrand Russell held that the universe needs no explanation: it is "just there, and that's all." Stephen Hawking later said the same.2
Reply, against the argumentA universe that might not have existed needs explaining
Robert Koons answers that no one needs to observe a universe being caused to conclude that a contingent thing, one that might not have existed, needs a cause. Defenders of the argument from contingency hold that the universe is contingent and so needs an explanation.2
Reply, for the argumentThe universe is unlike the things in it
Wes Morriston answers that the universe is very unlike the ordinary things from which we learn that causes are needed. Russell held that reasoning from contingent parts to a contingent whole commits the fallacy of composition.2
Reply, against the argumentHere the whole shares the nature of its parts
Theists such as Reichenbach answer that if every contingent thing in the universe ceased to exist at once, the universe would cease too, so it is contingent like its parts, as a wall built of bricks is brick.2
Reply, for the argumentA God who fits any world predicts none
Michael Martin argues that a free God could create any kind of world or none at all, so adding God to what we know does not make a complex universe, or this universe, any more likely.2
4ConclusionTherefore, naturalism is the better explanation of the world.
What both sides acceptCritics of the argument dispute its premises. As Draper says of his own version of the argument, only the premises are controversial.6
For the argument
For the argumentOne argument can answer every supernatural god
Draper describes a strategy open to atheists: if there are good arguments that nature is a closed system, every god that would have to be supernatural is ruled out at once, with no need to examine each idea of God separately.6
Reply, against the argumentNot every idea of God is supernatural
Draper notes that the strategy works only if naturalism can be defined narrowly enough to rule out every God, yet broadly enough to be argued for. Some philosophers, such as Fiona Ellis, deny that God is supernatural and accept both naturalism and theism.6
Against the argument
The sources used give no point here.
5The burden of proofWithout good evidence for God, the reasonable stance is not to believe in God.
For the argument
For the argumentThe presumption of atheism
Antony Flew argued for a "presumption of atheism": reasonable people do not believe in God without sufficient evidence, and without it the proper stance is atheism, which he defined as not believing in God, rather than agnosticism.869
Reply, against the argumentBelief in God can be properly basic
Alvin Plantinga argues that reasonable belief in God need not be based on argument. It can be properly basic, the product of a basic faculty that John Calvin called the sense of the divine.8
Reply, for the argumentEven basic beliefs may need grounds
Draper notes that an agnostic might reply that this sense of the divine, unlike memory, works only sporadically, is easily resisted, and yields beliefs that can be explained without it. Evans and Baggett report that some would add that such a belief may still need other evidence, such as experience.68
Reply, against the argumentAtheism makes a claim about everything too
Evans and Baggett argue that God is not one more thing in the world, like a leprechaun, but the creator on whom every finite thing depends. Theism and atheism are rival claims about the character of the whole universe, so both are risky, and an atheist committed to naturalism owes evidence too.8
Reply, for the argumentCompare theism with a specific rival
Draper holds that much debate over the burden of proof is sidetracked by bad analogies, such as Santa Claus or Russell's teapot orbiting the sun. His argument compares theism not merely with its denial but with source physicalism, and holds that if the evidence is ambiguous or absent, theism's low starting probability makes it very probably false.6
Against the argument
The sources used give no point here.
Where does the argument come from?
The map combines more than one author's version of the argument, as the note above it explains, but its central question is old.26 Thomas Aquinas (about 1225 to 1274) stated it as an objection to his own arguments for God: if nature and human will account for everything we see, there seems "no need to suppose God's existence." He then answered it in the same article.310 The principle of simplicity behind the argument is older still. Aristotle preferred demonstrations from fewer assumptions, Aquinas held that nature does not use two instruments where one suffices, and Isaac Newton made a version of the principle the first of his rules of reasoning in the Principia (1687).1 Modern statements of Ockham's razor are connected only loosely to William of Ockham himself.1
In the eighteenth century, David Hume attacked the view of causation on which the cosmological argument relies (1748), and Bertrand Russell later followed Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) in holding that we cannot ask about the cause of something like the universe, which we never experience.2 Helen De Cruz writes that since the seventeenth century, scientific findings pushed God increasingly to the margins, partly because the idea of scientific laws seemed to leave no room for special acts of God.5 A story, which the MacTutor archive of the history of mathematics quotes from Augustus De Morgan's A Budget of Paradoxes, has Napoleon telling Pierre-Simon Laplace that his huge book on the system of the world never mentions the author of the universe, and Laplace replying, "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis." In the same story, Joseph-Louis Lagrange, told of the exchange, calls it a fine hypothesis that explains many things.11
In 1972 Antony Flew (1923 to 2010) argued for a "presumption of atheism," which places the burden of proof on belief in God.9612 Piers Benn writes that in about 2004 Flew was reported to have come to believe in some kind of God.12 Flew then published There Is a God (2007) with Roy Abraham Varghese, though Benn notes a dispute over how much of the book Flew himself wrote, and that it is not entirely clear what he finally thought.12 J. L. Mackie's The Miracle of Theism (1982) challenged Swinburne's view that God is a simple explanation.2 Today Oppy and Draper defend versions of the argument, and Swinburne and Plantinga are among those who answer it.268
Across traditions
Buddhist teaching, as the Theravada writer Nyanaponika Thera presents it, shares the argument's doubt about a creator but not its view that nature is all there is, while the other faiths covered here each have their own account of how God relates to nature.13 The sources used for this page record no Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, or Latter-day Saint answer aimed at the argument itself.
Nyanaponika writes that the Buddhist thinkers of old found a creator God entirely unconvincing as an explanation of the universe, and that Buddhism is atheistic only in denying an eternal, all-powerful creator.13 He adds that the Buddha rejected materialism, which the texts call annihilationism, and taught rebirth and a goal beyond the world, nirvana (in Pali, Nibbana).13 The Dalai Lama, whose line is linked with the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, describes the Buddhist view of the self as designated on the basis of body and mind, and says that neither matter nor consciousness has a beginning.1415
Christian thinkers answer in more than one way. William Carroll, building on the thought of Aquinas, holds that God does not compete with natural causes.5 Not every Christian philosopher accepts methodological naturalism as a rule for science: Alvin Plantinga holds that religious doctrines can make a difference to how science is done.4
Philosophers of the Nyaya school, which defended Hindu theism by inference, argued that reason can show that the world has a maker: things like the earth have a maker, Udayana reasoned, because they are products.16 Buddhist, Mimamsa, and later Jain philosophers charged that Nyaya could reach a single maker of the world only by extrapolating far beyond the link between ordinary products and their makers, and the Nyaya commentator Vacaspati Mishra answered that even ordinary induction involves some inference to the best explanation, enough to infer a new kind of entity from what experience shows.16 The Vaishnava philosopher Ramanuja (1017 to 1137 by traditional accounts) wrote what the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls a classic criticism of natural theology, the attempt to know God by reason alone. On his view, scripture, taken at first on faith, shows a person where to look, and devotion (bhakti) becomes a direct awareness of Brahman, the ultimate reality.17 In Ramanuja's South Indian tradition of devotion to Vishnu, John Carman writes, the Lord enters the heart of every finite being as its inner controller, without erasing its distinct existence or its moral responsibility.18
In Islam, the Ash'arite school of Sunni theology, founded by al-Ash'ari (died 935 or 936), held a view known as occasionalism: created things have no causal powers of their own, and God creates the world anew at every moment.1920 Al-Ghazali, of the same school, also weighed the model of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), on which God acts through chains of created causes, which philosophers call secondary causes.19
Within Judaism, Maimonides (1138 to 1204) joined belief in God with a strong preference for natural explanation: Kenneth Seeskin writes that his naturalism made him suspicious of miracles, and Maimonides argued that astrology has no scientific basis and should be abandoned even where sacred literature seems to support it.21 He also held that reason alone cannot show whether the world was created or is eternal, though he said he believed in creation.21
Latter-day Saint teaching, as the philosopher David L. Paulsen reads it in BYU Studies, departs from classical theism in how it relates God to the world.22 Latter-day Saint scripture teaches that there is no immaterial matter: all spirit is matter, though finer or purer, and visible only to purified eyes (Doctrine and Covenants 131:7-8).23 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints also teaches that the Father and the Son have bodies of flesh and bones.24 Paulsen writes that since Joseph Smith taught that some entities and structures are as eternal as God, it does not follow on his premises that God is the total or even the ultimate explanation of everything else.22
Where does the debate stand?
The debate turns largely on philosophical questions of simplicity, explanatory power, and the burden of proof.28 Draper argues that the success of methodological naturalism could be evidence for naturalism.5 Many philosophers of religion, for their part, deny that the method itself implies atheism or agnosticism.4 Reichenbach, surveying the cosmological argument, calls whether simplicity can bear the weight of Swinburne's case the key question in dispute.2 Oppy writes that a reasonable Christian and a reasonable anti-supernaturalist are highly likely to disagree about a great many things, and will certainly disagree about whether God exists.2
Common questions
What is the argument from naturalism and simplicity?
It argues that naturalism, the view that nothing exists beyond nature, explains the world at least as well as theism with fewer kinds of things, so it is the better explanation. Graham Oppy and Paul Draper defend versions of it. Richard Swinburne answers that God is the simplest kind of person there can be, and so the simpler explanation.
Does science disprove God?
This argument does not say so. Methodological naturalism, the rule that science looks only for natural causes, is silent on whether anything exists beyond nature, and many philosophers of religion deny that it implies atheism. Paul Draper argues that its success could be evidence for naturalism, and Alvin Plantinga holds that religious doctrines can shape scientific practice.
Who has the burden of proof about God?
Antony Flew argued for a presumption of atheism: without sufficient evidence, one should not believe. Alvin Plantinga answers that belief in God can be properly basic, reasonable without argument. C. Stephen Evans and David Baggett argue that an atheism committed to naturalism, a claim about the whole universe, needs evidence too. Paul Draper compares theism with a specific rival.
Read next
Sources
- Alan Baker. Simplicity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Bruce Reichenbach. Cosmological Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 2 (The Existence of God). New Advent (Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation, second revised edition, 1920), 1920, First Part, Question 2, Article 3, with Objection 1 and its reply. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- David Papineau. Naturalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Helen De Cruz. Religion and Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Paul Draper. Atheism and Agnosticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Pew Research Center. Scientists and Belief. Pew Research Center, 2009. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- C. Stephen Evans and David Baggett. Moral Arguments for the Existence of God. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Antony Flew. The Presumption of Atheism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2(1), September 1972, pages 29 to 46 (Cambridge University Press), 1972, 29 to 46. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Pierre-Simon Laplace, Quotations. MacTutor History of Mathematics Archive, University of St Andrews. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Piers Benn. Antony Flew (1923-2010). Philosophy Now, issue 79, 2010. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Nyanaponika Thera. Buddhism and the God-idea. Buddhist Publication Society, via Access to Insight, 1994, opening paragraphs. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Frank E. Reynolds and Charles Hallisey. Buddhism: An Overview. Encyclopedia of Religion (Macmillan Reference USA), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987, introduction; "Buddhism as Pan-Asian Civilization"; "Buddhism as Cultural Religion". Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Empowerment and Teaching at Shillong Polo Ground. dalailama.com, 2014. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Matthew R. Dasti. Nyaya. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, introduction and section 3. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Jon McGinnis and Rahim Acar. Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- David L. Paulsen. Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil. BYU Studies 39, number 1, page 53, section "The Logical Problem of Evil". Accessed 2026-11-20.
- The Book of Mormon (1920 edition), the Doctrine and Covenants and the Pearl of Great Price (1921 editions). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1920. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Godhead, Topics and Questions. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-04.