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    The Existence of God: an argument for God

    Does change need a first cause? The first-cause arguments

    The first-cause arguments hold that whatever changes is changed by something else, that the chain of causes cannot go on forever, and so that a first cause exists. Defenders from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to Edward Feser take that cause to be God. Critics question the ban on an endless chain and the step from a first cause to God.

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    The argument, step by step

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Whatever changes is changed by something else, and nothing is the cause of itself.
    2. Premise 2The chain of changers, or of causes, cannot go on to infinity: without a first, there would be no others.
    3. ConclusionTherefore, there is a first changer that nothing else changes, and a first cause that nothing else causes.
    4. From a first cause to GodThis first changer and first cause is what everyone calls God.

    1Premise 1Whatever changes is changed by something else, and nothing is the cause of itself.

    What both sides acceptThe argument starts from what Thomas Aquinas calls evident to the senses: some things in the world change, and some things bring others about. By "motion" he means any change, which he describes as the passage from potentiality, what a thing can be, to actuality, what it is, as when fire makes wood that is potentially hot actually hot.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentNothing gives itself what it lacks

    Aquinas argues that only something already actual can bring a thing from potential to actual, and that nothing can be actual and potential in the same respect at once: what is actually hot is not at the same time potentially hot. So nothing moves itself, and nothing causes itself, since it would then exist before itself.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentCauses are not shown to be real powers

    David Hume attacked, as lacking evidence, both the view of causation that cosmological arguments presuppose, that a cause is an objective power that produces and necessitates its effect, and their principle that every contingent being has a cause of its existence.2

    Reply, for the argumentThe principle of causality is common sense

    Christopher M. Brown, the author of the Internet Encyclopedia's entry on Aquinas, holds that the principle that every effect has a cause is common sense and arguably plays a pivotal role in science: a scientist who asks what makes plants grow assumes there is an answer in terms of causes. To deny the principle only in metaphysics, he argues, would seem ad hoc.3

    2Premise 2The chain of changers, or of causes, cannot go on to infinity: without a first, there would be no others.

    What both sides acceptCommentators generally agree, the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on Aquinas reports, that the Ways rule out an endless series of causes acting together at the same time, a "vertical" series, not a series running back in time. Aquinas did not think a series going back in time could be shown impossible, and he held that reason cannot prove whether the world had a beginning.4

    For the argument

    For the argumentLater causes act only through the first

    In Aquinas's example, a staff moves only because a hand moves it. In such an essentially ordered series, Bruce Reichenbach's entry on the cosmological argument explains, each member's power to act depends on the activity of those before it, in an order of dependence, not necessarily of time, so without a first cause there would be no later ones. Caleb Cohoe describes Aquinas's account of causality as primarily a vertical relation, not a horizontal one.12

    For the argumentA song lasts only while the singer sings

    Brown notes that a sculpture can outlive its sculptor, so the premise would fail for a series of causes spread out over time. He reads Aquinas instead as speaking of causes that act together, as a song exists only while the singer sings it.3

    For the argumentA borrowed power needs a source that has it

    Ben Cook argues that a power can be conferred only by something that has it intrinsically, and that anything whose power is wholly conferred cannot use it without the ongoing activity of what confers it. Since not every power can be conferred, something must have the power in itself: a first cause.2

    Reply, against the argumentAn infinite series is not a finite one missing its first member

    Thomas Oberle argues that such defenses make a critical confusion. Removing the first cause from a finite series does remove the series' power to act, but holding that a series is infinite is not the same as removing the first cause of a finite one.2

    Reply, for the argumentWithout a first, the explanation never arrives

    Ross Cameron argues that in such a series each member's power is explained by those it depends on. With no first member, each account rests on the next, so the explanation is always promised and never delivered: a vicious regress. A series ordered in time can be infinite without this problem, he holds, but a series of present dependence cannot.2

    Reply, against the argumentTaken member by member, there is no vicious regress

    Oberle responds that there is no vicious regress if the series is considered member by member rather than as one collection.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentAn endless chain of causes is possible

    Baruch Spinoza, following the Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescas, rejected the Aristotelian ban on an actual infinite and held an endless regress of causes to be legitimate. The force of the old proof, he wrote, lies not in the impossibility of such a regress but in the claim that things that do not exist by their own nature need something that does.5

    3ConclusionTherefore, there is a first changer that nothing else changes, and a first cause that nothing else causes.

    What both sides acceptSet out step by step, as Brown does for the Second Way, the conclusion follows from the premises by standard rules of logic. The dispute is over whether the premises are true, and over what kind of series of causes they describe.32

    For the argument

    For the argumentA first cause need not be first in time

    Aquinas's Ways, Brown writes, do not try to show that God is first in time but first in an ontological sense: other things depend on God for their existence at every moment. In his Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas even argues on the supposition that the world has always existed, since on that supposition God's existence is harder to show.3

    Reply, against the argumentBeing caused implies a beginning

    In Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character Cleanthes asks how anything that has existed from eternity could have a cause, since that relation implies something earlier in time and a beginning of existence.6

    For the argumentAn unmoved mover moves as an object of desire

    Aristotle held that something can cause motion without being moved, in the way an object of desire or of thought moves those drawn to it. The first mover, on his account, moves the outermost heaven as a good that is desired, and its own activity is understanding itself.7

    Reply, against the argumentAn unchanged object causes sight only when other factors act

    The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti considered a similar case, as Richard Hayes reconstructs it: a patch of color causes sight without itself changing. Nothing becomes actual without first being potential, he argued, and the color is seen only when other factors, such as light and an attentive eye, trigger its potential. Hayes applies the same reasoning to God as creator: either outside factors trigger God's power to create, or God triggers it himself, and so changes.8

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentAn unchanging being cannot be a cause

    Dharmakirti argued that to be a cause is to undergo some change, as soil changes when a seedling grows from it. A permanent, unchanging being would be exactly the same whether causing or not, and since it never changes, he held, its power to act is hard to believe.8

    Against the argumentNo cosmological argument yet persuades

    Graham Oppy holds that no cosmological argument produced so far ought to persuade reasonable people like himself who are not already persuaded of its conclusion, and so, by his standard, none is a good argument.2

    Reply, for the argumentPersuasion is not the only test of an argument

    Reichenbach replies that by that measure there are no successful arguments against God either. Arguments have other roles, he holds: Anselm and Aquinas offered theirs to help themselves and others understand God, as faith seeking understanding.2

    4From a first cause to GodThis first changer and first cause is what everyone calls God.

    For the argument

    For the argumentAquinas argues for God's attributes in what follows

    Robert Pasnau, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on Aquinas, explains that Aquinas goes on, in the questions that follow, to argue that the first cause is not a body and is simple, perfect, the highest good, infinite, present everywhere, unchangeable, eternal, one, and perfect in knowledge.4

    Reply, against the argumentGod's attributes may not be deducible from a first cause

    Oppy, examining a modern attempt by Robert Koons to derive the properties traditionally given to God from a first cause, expresses significant skepticism that such a deduction is possible.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA first cause is not yet the God of religion

    Reichenbach writes that Aquinas was quick to identify God with the first mover or first cause, and that the identification seems to go beyond the causal reasoning of his argument, though one can argue that it fits the larger picture of God in Aquinas's writings. Pasnau notes that, at that stage, for all the Ways show, the first cause might itself be a body.24

    Against the argumentReason reaches a simple first cause, not the one God

    Crescas held that philosophy can prove the existence of a simple cause of the world but cannot reach God's uniqueness, which he held is known only from revelation, the Torah and the tradition.9

    Where does the argument come from?

    The argument began in Greek philosophy. In Western philosophy, the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry reports, the earliest version of a cosmological argument appears in Plato's Laws, but the classical argument is rooted in Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics.2 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that the eternal motion of the heavens needs a starting-point whose very being is activity, without matter.7 This first mover moves the heavens without being moved, and Aristotle counted forty-nine movers of the heavenly spheres, coordinated under a single prime mover.7

    Aristotle and his followers held that the world had always existed. They saw God as the first mover, the remote source of motions that had always been, rather than an eternal being who brought the universe newly into being.4 Islamic, Jewish, and Christian philosophers took up the argument from motion in the Middle Ages.10112

    Thomas Aquinas (about 1225 to 1274) set out the argument in the first two of the five ways of proving God's existence in his Summa Theologiae.214 He gave a much longer version of the argument from motion in his Summa Contra Gentiles.3 The First Way argues from motion, meaning any change; the Second argues from efficient causes, the things that bring other things about.1 Each of the five ends with a version of the same formula: this is what everyone calls God.4

    Across traditions

    The argument from motion passed from Aristotle to Islamic, Jewish, and Christian philosophers.10114 Avicenna (Ibn Sina, about 980 to 1037) held that physics, which studies motion, reaches no more than a prime mover and cannot answer where the world's existence comes from, and in Judaism, Crescas questioned the Aristotelian premises behind it.2129 Hindu and Buddhist philosophers asked whether reasoning alone can find the world's cause, and whether an unchanging being can cause change at all.138 Latter-day Saint scripture names the motion of the earth and the planets as a witness to a Creator.14 Latter-day Saint teaching also holds that God the Father has a body, where Aquinas and Maimonides argued that the first cause is not a body.14411 The sources used here record no Latter-day Saint answer to the argument itself.

    Dharmakirti (about 600 to 660), a Buddhist philosopher, pressed the question of how an unchanging being could cause change.8 He held, as Richard Hayes explains in a study of Buddhist arguments against a creator, that a cause must undergo some change, at least in its circumstances.8 A weapon, for example, must come into contact with a body before it wounds it.8 God is held to be present everywhere and always in contact with everything, he reasoned, so no change in a thing can come solely from a new relation to God.8

    In Christianity, Aquinas held that natural reason can show that a first cause exists.4 It cannot establish what distinctively marks the Christian God, such as God's triune nature and God's becoming human; those truths, he held, are known through revelation.4 Christopher M. Brown writes that Aquinas did not think the Second Way proves the Triune God, which he believed by faith.3 Aquinas thought that Jews, Muslims, Christians, and thinkers outside those faiths, such as Aristotle, could all agree that an uncaused first cause is what people call God.3

    The Brahma Sutra, a founding text of the Vedanta schools of Hindu thought, describes Brahman, the ultimate reality, as the source of the world's origin, existence, and dissolution (Brahma Sutra 1.1.2).13 Shankara, the teacher of Advaita Vedanta, flourished in the eighth century CE.15 In his commentary, he holds that this cause is known through the Upanishads, the texts of Vedanta, and not by inference.13 Since only the world is perceived, he argues, perception cannot tell whether it is connected with Brahman or with something else; inference can still confirm what scripture teaches.13

    Shankara was answering some who held that a Lord who causes the world can be inferred without scripture; a note in George Thibaut's translation identifies them as the Vaisheshikas.13 Devotional (bhakti) philosophies, among worshippers of Vishnu and of Shiva alike, range from nondualism to dualism, John B. Carman writes, yet almost all agree that the divine reality is infinitely superior and that finite souls and material things have some subordinate reality.16

    In Islam, Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126 to 1198) argued from Aristotelian physics to a first cause.10 He distinguished causes ordered essentially, which act at once, as wind moves waves and waves move a ship, from causes ordered over time. Rain, for example, comes from a cloud, the cloud from vapor, and the vapor from earlier rain.10 An endless series of the first kind is impossible, he held, but a series of the second kind can run back forever. He followed Aristotle in holding that the world is eternal.10

    He allowed that there could in principle be many unmoved movers, but held that there must be at least one.10 He suggests that God is not an efficient cause, one that sets things moving, but a final and formal cause: the goal whose thoughts inspire the intelligences of the heavens. The Stanford entry notes that interpreting him here is more contentious than its summary suggests.10

    In Judaism, Maimonides (1138 to 1204) offered several proofs of God's existence in his Guide of the Perplexed (2.1), all of them versions of the cosmological argument.11 One assumes that the heavens move eternally.11 Since a body can hold only finite power, it reasons, eternal motion needs an infinite power that is neither a body nor a force in a body.11 The argument, Maimonides held, gives grounds for saying that God is, but not what God is.11 Hasdai Crescas (about 1340 to 1410 or 1411) criticized fourteen of the Aristotelian premises behind these proofs, and argued against Maimonides' six proofs of God's existence, unity, and immateriality.9 Aristotle had denied that an actual infinite exists; Crescas defended its possibility.9

    Latter-day Saint teaching holds that God the Father has a body of flesh and bones (Doctrine and Covenants 130:22).14 Latter-day Saints believe that the merging of early Christian theology with Greek philosophy was a grave error, and their view of God differs from the later creeds.14 In the Book of Mormon, Alma names the earth's motion and the regular movement of the planets as witnesses to a Supreme Creator (Alma 30:44).14

    Where does the debate stand?

    Interest in Aquinas's versions has revived, the Stanford entry reports, and it centers on whether a series of causes ordered by present dependence can be infinite.2 Gaven Kerr, Edward Feser, Caleb Cohoe, and Ben Cook defend the thesis that it cannot.23 Thomas Oberle argues that their defenses confuse an infinite series with a finite one that lacks its first member. Ross Cameron holds that such an infinite series would be a vicious regress.2 The debate turns in part, the Stanford entry says, on the difference between present dependence and order in time, and on whether appealing to it begs the question.2 More broadly, Graham Oppy finds that no cosmological argument yet offered should move reasonable people like himself who are not already convinced. Bruce Reichenbach, the author of the Stanford entry, replies that by that standard no argument against God succeeds either.2

    Common questions

    What are Aquinas's First and Second Ways?

    They are the first two of the five arguments for God's existence that Thomas Aquinas gives in his Summa Theologiae. The First Way argues from change to a first mover that nothing else moves; the Second argues from causes to a first cause that nothing else causes. Each ends by saying that this first is what everyone calls God.

    Does the first-cause argument say the universe had a beginning?

    Not in Aquinas's version. Commentators generally agree that his Ways rule out an endless series of causes acting together at one time, not a series running back in time. Aquinas held that reason cannot prove whether the world began, and in his Summa Contra Gentiles he argued on the supposition that it had always existed.

    Is Aristotle's unmoved mover the same as God?

    Aristotle argued for a first mover whose being is activity, which moves the heavens without being moved, as an object of desire moves. His followers saw it as the remote source of motions that had always existed, not as a creator who brought the universe newly into being. Aquinas argued that the first cause is also simple, eternal, and one.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 2 (The Existence of God). New Advent (Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation, second revised edition, 1920), 1920, First Part, Question 2, Article 3, with Objection 1 and its reply. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    2. Bruce Reichenbach. Cosmological Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Christopher M. Brown. Thomas Aquinas. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Martin Lin. Principle of Sufficient Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 9. Hume Texts Online, 1779, Part 9. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. S. Marc Cohen and C. D. C. Reeve. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Richard P. Hayes. Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), pages 5 to 28 (author's copy, University of New Mexico), 1988. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    9. Shalom Sadik. Hasdai Crescas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024, sections 1 and 2.4. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    10. Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau. Ibn Rushd [Averroes]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    11. Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    12. Olga Lizzini. Ibn Sina's Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    13. George Thibaut (translator). The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya, part 1 (Sacred Books of the East, volume 34): Sutra 1.1.2. Clarendon Press, 1890; text read at Wisdom Library, 1890, Brahma Sutra 1.1.2. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    14. God the Father, Topics and Questions (2023). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.
    15. Neil Dalal. Sankara. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021, introduction and section 1. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    16. John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.