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    The Existence of God: an argument for belief

    Is believing in God a wise bet? Pascal's wager

    Pascal's wager argues that believing in God is the wise choice, not that God exists: if God exists, belief wins an infinite reward, and if not, only something finite is lost. Blaise Pascal set it out; Jeff Jordan and Paul Bartha defend versions today. Critics, from Denis Diderot to Alan Hajek, question its premises, logic, and ethics.

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    The argument, step by step

    The argument as Alan Hajek, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry, sets it out: three premises and two conclusions. It argues that wagering for God is the rational choice, not that God exists.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1God exists or does not, and you can wager for God or against. Wagering for God, if God exists, brings an infinite reward; every other outcome is finite.
    2. Premise 2Reason requires you to give God's existence some probability above zero.
    3. Premise 3Reason requires you to choose the act with the highest expected value.
    4. Conclusion 1Therefore, reason requires you to wager for God.
    5. Conclusion 2So you should wager for God.

    1Premise 1God exists or does not, and you can wager for God or against. Wagering for God, if God exists, brings an infinite reward; every other outcome is finite.

    For the argument

    For the argumentAn infinite gain against a finite stake

    Blaise Pascal argues that there is "an eternity of life and happiness" to gain, against a stake that is finite. Wherever the gain is infinite and the chances of loss are not infinitely many, he holds, "there is no time to hesitate, you must give all."12

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentOther gods could make the same offer

    If reason cannot decide whether God exists, other ideas of God are live options too. Pascal presumably had the Catholic idea of God in mind, but Denis Diderot objected in 1746: "An Imam could reason just as well this way." J. L. Mackie suggests that salvation might be found not in the Church of Rome but among the Anabaptists, the Latter-day Saints, or Sunni Muslims, or with devotees of the Hindu goddess Kali or of Odin, and James Cargile illustrates how easily new gods can be imagined without limit.23

    Reply, for the argumentSome gods deserve more belief than others

    George Schlesinger proposes that when every option promises infinite reward, the most probable should be chosen. Jeff Jordan suggests that some outlandish ideas of God may be set aside for having "no backing of tradition," and James Franklin argues that Pascal wrote for real people in the Paris of 1660, for whom the live options were Catholicism and atheism.2

    Reply, against the argumentPascal's readers knew many religions

    Paul Saka replies that Pascal's peers knew of the religions of ancient Greece and Rome, of Judaism, Islam, the Indigenous religions of the Americas, and several kinds of Protestantism, and knew that still other religions could easily be imagined.2

    Reply, for the argumentSimplicity favors a perfect God

    William Lycan and Schlesinger argue that, as science prefers the simplest theory that fits the evidence, simplicity favors the idea of an absolutely perfect God, which, Hajek adds, is Pascal's, over rival gods whose natures raise further questions. Paul Bartha models how a person's probabilities for rival gods could settle over time, which, Hajek writes, provides a kind of vindication of Pascal against the objection.2

    Against the argumentAn infinite reward may make no sense, or may go to everyone

    Richard Jeffrey and Edward McClennen argue that the very idea of infinite value is suspect. Nicholas Rescher considers that a forgiving God might reward believers and unbelievers alike, and William James observes that God might not infinitely reward belief adopted only for the mercenary reasons Pascal gives.2

    Reply, for the argumentInfinite value can be handled with ratios

    Bartha argues that his reformulation of the wager, which compares options by the ratios of their values, answers some of the most pressing objections that turn on infinite value.2

    2Premise 2Reason requires you to give God's existence some probability above zero.

    For the argument

    For the argumentAny chance above zero is enough

    Pascal's guiding insight, Hajek writes, is that the argument works whatever probability you give God's existence, provided it is above zero and not infinitely small.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA probability of zero, or none at all, may be rational

    Graham Oppy, among others, points out that a strict atheist may rationally give God's existence a probability of zero, for example by holding that the idea of an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good being is contradictory; the wager then has no pull. Perhaps, too, one may rationally assign no probability at all, a response for which Hajek finds some support in Pascal's own words: "Reason can decide nothing here."2

    3Premise 3Reason requires you to choose the act with the highest expected value.

    What both sides acceptExpected value is the measure decision theory uses for choices under risk: for each possible state of the world, multiply the value an action would bring by that state's probability, then add the results.2

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentMaximizing expected value can mislead

    The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes are said to show that maximizing expected value can lead to choices that seem worse. In the St. Petersburg paradox, paying any finite price to play a game of infinite expected value seems absurd, a case that bears directly on the wager. One may also hold that practical reason favors the wager while theoretical reason may require proportioning belief to evidence.2

    Reply, for the argumentRefined decision rules may serve Pascal

    Hajek notes that refinements of expected value theory, such as comparing options by their expected differences or by Bartha's ratios, open the door to a reformulation of the premise that might serve Pascal's purposes.2

    4Conclusion 1Therefore, reason requires you to wager for God.

    What both sides acceptThe argument concludes that wagering for God is the rational choice, not that God exists. Pascal, Hajek writes, aims to show that we ought to believe in God rather than that God exists, and gives reasons of prudence rather than evidence; he holds that reason alone cannot settle whether God exists.21

    For the argument

    For the argumentEven critics grant that the argument is valid

    Several authors otherwise critical of the wager, among them Mackie, Rescher, Gregory Mougin and Elliott Sober, and most emphatically Ian Hacking, grant that it is valid: given Pascal's premises, reason does require wagering for God.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentMixed strategies also promise infinite value

    Antony Duff and Hajek argue that the argument is invalid. A mixed strategy, such as tossing a coin and wagering for God only if it lands heads, also has infinite expected value, and, it can be argued, so does almost anything one might do.2

    Reply, for the argumentRepeated tosses lead to wagering for God

    Bradley Monton answers that one who loses the toss can toss again, and that with probability one the coin will eventually land heads, so the strategy leads in the end to wagering for God.2

    Reply, against the argumentNot every mixed strategy ends in wagering

    Robertson replies, in a 2012 paper, that not every such strategy is bound to end in wagering for God, since the chance of wagering can shrink fast enough from one trial to the next.2

    Reply, for the argumentAn idealized chooser ends up wagering

    Kenny Easwaran and Monton answer that if there are uncountably many moments at which to act, wagering for God follows with probability one. They grant that this idealization cannot be physically realized, but hold that one should act as an idealized self would.2

    5Conclusion 2So you should wager for God.

    What both sides acceptWhat wagering for God involves is disputed: believing in God, or taking steps toward belief. On Hajek's reading, it is an ongoing course of action that lasts until death, adopting practices and a way of life that foster belief in God; other authors, such as Philip Quinn and Jordan, read Pascal as arguing that you should believe in God.2

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentBelief cannot be chosen at will

    Hajek notes the objection that one cannot simply believe in God at will, and that reason cannot require the impossible. Pascal anticipates it: his imagined listener says that he is "so made that I cannot believe."21

    Reply, for the argumentAct as believers do, and belief will follow

    Pascal advises acting as if one believed, "taking the holy water, having masses said," and lessening the passions that stand in the way. These are actions one can take at will, Hajek notes, so even a nonbeliever can wager for God by striving to believe.12

    Reply, against the argumentOne may strive to believe and still fail

    Critics may question this account of how belief forms, Hajek adds: one could follow Pascal's advice exactly and still fail to believe.2

    Reply, for the argumentGenuine striving would be rewarded

    A follower of Pascal, Hajek suggests, might reply that genuine striving already displays a purity of heart that God would fully reward.2

    Against the argumentWagering may corrupt the one who wagers

    Pascal himself grants that his remedy will "deaden your acuteness"; his French means, literally, "will make you a beast." W. K. Clifford argues that believing on insufficient evidence harms society by promoting credulity, and Terence Penelhum that a plan condemning honest nonbelievers to the loss of eternal happiness is itself immoral.2

    Reply, for the argumentFavoring believers is not unjust

    Quinn answers that as long as God treats nonbelievers justly, there is nothing immoral in God's showing special favor to believers, perhaps more than they deserve.2

    Reply, against the argumentThe wager leaves open whether nonbelievers are treated justly

    Hajek notes that the wager leaves open whether the outcome for nonbelievers is just; as far as Pascal's argument goes, it may be extremely unjust.2

    Against the argumentGambling does not suit the subject

    Voltaire found the wager "a bit indecent and childish": its talk of gambling, losses, and winnings, he held, does not suit the gravity of the subject. Schlesinger states a sharper form of the objection: an appeal to self-interest is incompatible with the quest for piety.2

    Reply, for the argumentThe choice cannot be avoided

    Schlesinger replies that the joy of salvation is "of the most exalted kind," and that seeking it, if greed at all, is "a noble greed." Franklin argues that Voltaire caricatures the wager and misses its key point, that one must wager, and that its conclusion concerns action, not the truth of theism.2

    Where does the argument come from?

    The wager comes from Blaise Pascal (1623 to 1662), a French mathematician and lifelong Catholic, and from one fragment of his Pensees, published after his death in 1670.42 The Pensees are the unfinished notes for a planned defense of the Christian religion.4 In a single section of them, Hajek finds four arguments for believing, or at least taking steps to believe, in God; only the third is traditionally called Pascal's wager.2 It is fragment 233 in W. F. Trotter's English translation of 1910, and fragment 418/680 in the numbering of the Internet Encyclopedia's entry.24

    Similar reasoning is older.2 John Ryan found it in Plato, Arnobius, and Lactantius, and Franklin finds striking parallels in two works of 1637 and 1638, a few years before Pascal.2 David Simpson, the author of the Internet Encyclopedia's entry, adds Euripides' play The Bacchae, in which Cadmus argues that it is prudent to honor Dionysus as a god even without believing him.4 What is distinctive in Pascal, Hajek writes, is the explicit form of decision theory, the theory of rational choice when outcomes are uncertain, and Hacking called the wager "the first well-understood contribution to decision theory."2

    Simpson writes that Pascal's own move from lukewarm to wholehearted faith came through a mystical experience on the night of November 23, 1654, not through argument.4 So it is unlikely, in Simpson's view, that Pascal gave the wager serious personal consideration, though he may well have thought it would appeal to the skeptics and gamblers he knew in the salons and gaming rooms of Paris.4

    Across traditions

    Reasoning like the wager appears in a Buddhist discourse and, by one scholar's account, in the work of a Muslim theologian, and the wager itself arose in Catholic Christianity.52 None of the sources consulted here gives a Hindu, Jewish, or Latter-day Saint response particular to the wager.

    Buddhism. A discourse of the Buddha, the Apannaka Sutta, which Bhikkhu Sujato translates as "A Sure Bet," contains an argument that Buddhist scholars say anticipates Pascal's wager.567 Its subject is not God, whom Buddhism in its main forms does not affirm, but karma and rebirth.58 Speaking to householders who had found no teacher they trusted, the Buddha compares two views: that there is no afterlife and no fruit of good and bad deeds, and that there is (Middle Discourses 60).6 A sensible person, he says, reflects that one who affirms another world is praised by sensible people in this life even if there is none, and if there is one, is also reborn in a heavenly realm; one who denies it is criticized in this life, and if there is another world, is also reborn in a bad place.6 Bronwyn Finnigan argues that this reasoning, which she calls the Buddha's wager, anticipates two versions of Pascal's argument but not its best-known form, and is likely the earliest written example of the dominance reasoning that Pascal also uses.5 In one form of that reasoning, which Hajek calls superdominance, the worst outcome of one choice is at least as good as the best outcome of the other, and in at least one possible state of the world the first choice turns out strictly better than the other.2 Finnigan argues that the Buddha's wager does not make accepting its advice rationally required.5

    Christianity. Pascal wrote as a Catholic, and Hajek writes that he presumably had the Catholic idea of God in mind.42 He embraced Jansenism, a movement within French Catholicism whose followers, in Simpson's words, "accepted the strict Augustinian creed that salvation is achieved not by human virtue or merit but solely by the grace of God."4 Today, Hajek writes, the wager serves Christian apologetics and also shapes thinking about infinity, decision theory, probability, and moral philosophy.2

    Islam. Hajek suggests adding al-Ghazali (about 1056 to 1111) to the list of the wager's precursors, citing a 1920 study, in Spanish, of the wager's Muslim precedents.29

    Where does the debate stand?

    The wager remains one of the best-known arguments in the philosophy of religion.2 Hajek writes that it vies with the ontological argument for being the most famous argument in the field, and that its influence today is arguably greater than that of any other such argument.2 Jordan, Bartha, Schlesinger, and Monton defend the wager or versions of it, while Oppy, Duff, Saka, and Hajek press objections.2 Hajek also offers valid reformulations of the wager that represent the value of salvation in more nuanced ways, and Bartha and Lawrence Pasternack edited a collection of essays on the wager, published by Cambridge University Press in 2018.2

    Common questions

    Does Pascal's wager prove that God exists?

    No. The wager argues that believing in God is the wise choice, not that God exists. Pascal held that reason alone cannot know whether God exists, so he weighed outcomes: wagering for God stakes something finite for a chance at infinite reward, the rational choice, he held, whenever that chance is above zero and not infinitely small.

    What is the many-gods objection to Pascal's wager?

    It holds that if reason cannot decide whether God exists, it cannot rule out other gods either, so the same reasoning could recommend many rival faiths. Denis Diderot made the point in 1746. Defenders such as William Lycan and George Schlesinger reply that some ideas of God are more probable than others, for example by being simpler.

    Can a person choose to believe in God?

    Pascal granted that belief cannot simply be willed. He advised acting as believers do, taking holy water and having masses said, so that belief would follow. Critics answer that one could follow this advice and still fail to believe, and William James observes that God might not infinitely reward belief adopted only for the mercenary reasons Pascal gives.

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    Sources

    1. Blaise Pascal. Pensees, Section III: Of the Necessity of the Wager (translated by W. F. Trotter). Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1910, fragment 233. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Alan Hajek. Pascal's Wager. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Rachel Fell McDermott. Goddess Worship: The Hindu Goddess. Encyclopedia of Religion (Macmillan Reference), via Encyclopedia.com, 2005. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    4. David Simpson. Pascal, Blaise. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Bronwyn Finnigan. The Buddha's Lucky Throw and Pascal's Wager. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102, number 3, 2024, 561 to 580. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Bhikkhu Sujato (translator). Middle Discourses 60: A Sure Bet. SuttaCentral (bilara-data repository), segments 4.1 to 12.7. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. Majjhima Nikaya 60 (Pali root text). SuttaCentral (bilara-data repository), segments 0.1 and 0.2 (the title lines). Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Charles Taliaferro. Philosophy of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    9. Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.