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    The Existence of God: an argument for God

    Is the universe fine-tuned for life? The fine-tuning argument

    The fine-tuning argument holds that life depends on physical constants falling within narrow ranges, that this would be very unlikely without a designer, and so that it is evidence for one. Defenders such as Robin Collins and Richard Swinburne take the designer to be God. Critics answer with a multiverse, the anthropic principle, and doubts about the probabilities.

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    The argument, step by step

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Life is possible only if the constants of nature, the laws, and the conditions of the early universe fall within narrow ranges, and in our universe they do.
    2. Premise 2Life-permitting conditions would be very improbable if there were no designer.
    3. Premise 3Life-permitting conditions would not be very improbable if there were a designer.
    4. ConclusionSo the fact that our universe permits life is evidence for a designer, and should raise our confidence that one exists.
    5. From a designer to GodThe best candidate for such a designer is God.

    1Premise 1Life is possible only if the constants of nature, the laws, and the conditions of the early universe fall within narrow ranges, and in our universe they do.

    What both sides acceptFine-tuning for life, as physicists use the phrase, means that life depends on the constants of nature, and on conditions in the early universe, falling within limited ranges. Physicists including Bernard Carr, Martin Rees, and Luke Barnes have described many such cases: if gravity had been much weaker, for example, galaxies, stars, and planets would not have formed. Fred Adams, who argues that the ranges are wider than many accounts suggest, also writes that the constants must fall within a range of values for the universe to support life.123

    For the argument

    For the argumentMany independent cases point the same way

    Robin Collins, whom the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls the leading defender of fine-tuning arguments today, and others cite several dozen constants. Even if some single calculations are inexact, they argue, the number of cases and their independence from one another count as evidence of design.4

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe fine-tuning is overstated

    Victor Stenger argues that the form of the laws is fixed by a weak requirement, that they look the same from any point of view, and that claims of fine-tuning usually vary only one constant at a time.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe region that permits life is likely very small

    Barnes answers that Stenger confuses that requirement with symmetries our laws happen to have. He reviews studies that vary many constants at once and concludes that the region of possible values that permits life is likely very small.12

    Against the argumentOur universe may be only moderately friendly to life

    Adams argues that the range of values that would permit life is quite considerable, and that the universe could have been even more favorable to life than it is, with slightly weaker gravity, for example.13

    Against the argumentLife might take forms we cannot picture

    Critics ask whether we underestimate how life might arise under other laws, since we tend to assume it must resemble life as we know it, and since there is no agreed definition of life.1

    Reply, for the argumentOther universes would lack the complexity life needs

    Defenders answer that universes with other constants would typically have far less structure and complexity. Any life must draw energy from its surroundings, and a universe with no stars, for example, would have no steady source of energy and no way to make the heavier elements.15

    2Premise 2Life-permitting conditions would be very improbable if there were no designer.

    What both sides acceptPhysical chance does not seem to apply here, since on the standard view other values of the constants are physically impossible, and probability in a purely logical sense meets difficulties of its own. So many recent versions of the argument use probability in the sense of what a reasoner would expect. Both a defender, Collins, and a critic, Bradley Monton, work with this sense of the word.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentWithout a designer, life-permitting values are unexpected

    Defenders argue that, given how narrow the ranges are, life-permitting conditions would be highly improbable without a designer, and Barnes defends this claim in a 2020 paper. They add that the actual values show no clear pattern, so elegance and simplicity would not lead anyone to expect them.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe probabilities are not well defined

    Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew, and Eric Vestrup argue that if a constant could take any value at all, there is no even way to spread probability over its values. Any finite range would then get zero probability, so life-permitting values would count as improbable whether or not fine-tuning is needed.15

    Reply, for the argumentThe problem is less damaging than it looks

    Jeffrey Koperski argues that this result is not as damaging to the argument as it may seem. Other replies limit the possible values to a very large but finite range, or use the mathematics of measure, as physics does elsewhere.15

    Against the argumentImprobable things happen all the time

    Any particular run of coin tosses is improbable, yet it needs no explanation; Stephen Jay Gould, and Erik Carlson and Erik Olsson, take the same view of fine-tuning.1

    Reply, for the argumentNot when good explanations are on offer

    John Leslie, who treats both design and a multiverse as candidate explanations, grants that improbable events do not in general call for explanation. Fine-tuning does, he argues, because reasonable explanations for it are available. Peter van Inwagen, Nick Bostrom, and Neil Manson and Michael Thrush hold similar views.1

    Reply, against the argumentGiven that life exists, its sensitivity is no surprise

    Cory Juhl argues on separate grounds that fine-tuning needs no response. Where Leslie and others judge life-permitting conditions unexpected once we set aside our knowledge that life exists, Juhl starts from that knowledge: life depends on so many independent facts that its sensitivity to the constants is to be expected.1

    Against the argumentFuture physics may explain the values

    Some hope that deeper physics will explain the values, much as evolution explains how living things fit their surroundings. Albert Einstein hoped for a theory whose constants are all fixed by principle, and inflationary cosmology, on its supporters' account, already explains one apparent case: why the early universe's density was almost exactly the critical value, at which space is flat. Not all cosmologists accept that account.1

    Reply, for the argumentMost constants show no clear pattern

    Simon Friederich, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry, replies that the critical density is a value physics can single out, while most other constants show no such pattern; Geraint Lewis and Barnes argue that this makes it hard to imagine a theory that would produce them. The entry adds that string theory, which many physicists see as the most promising candidate for a single theory of all the forces of nature, allows an enormous number of different laws and constants.1

    3Premise 3Life-permitting conditions would not be very improbable if there were a designer.

    For the argument

    For the argumentA good God would likely make a world with beings like us

    Richard Swinburne argues that we can be fairly confident that the God of traditional theism, eternal, all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly free, and perfectly good, would bring about an orderly world, extended in space, in which beings like us have a place.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWe cannot predict what a designer would do

    Elliott Sober argues that our judgments about design rest on what human designers do, and that the further a supposed designer is from the human case, the less we can say. Jan Narveson agrees that we cannot predict how a bodiless creator would act, and both hold that theists face a special difficulty in predicting God's choices here while appealing to God's mysterious ways in answering the problem of evil.1

    Reply, for the argumentEven a low chance given a designer is enough

    Michael Rota answers that even if the chance of life-permitting conditions given a designer were as low as one in a billion, the argument would stay strong, since without a designer they are far less likely still. John Hawthorne and Yoaav Isaacs make a similar point.1

    Reply, against the argumentManson defends Sober and Narveson

    Manson defends Sober and Narveson's position against the replies of Rota, Hawthorne, and Isaacs.1

    4ConclusionSo the fact that our universe permits life is evidence for a designer, and should raise our confidence that one exists.

    What both sides acceptOn the probability reasoning the argument uses, evidence that is more likely on one hypothesis than on another favors that hypothesis; Sober takes this comparison to be the core of the argument. How far belief should then move also depends on how likely a designer seemed before the evidence was weighed.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentBelief in a designer should rise

    Bayesian defenders, who treat belief as a matter of degree to be updated by evidence, conclude that unless the starting odds heavily favor no designer, belief in a designer should end up above one half.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWe could only ever observe a universe that permits life

    Drawing on the anthropic principle, Sober argues that observers can exist only where conditions permit life, so finding such conditions is no evidence for design. A net with large holes catches only large fish, and its catch says nothing about how many small fish the lake holds.15

    Reply, for the argumentThe firing squad

    Critics of the objection answer with Leslie's firing squad: a prisoner who is still alive after every marksman has fired should still ask whether they meant to miss. Jonathan Weisberg and Matthew Kotzen argue that Sober's analysis gives the wrong answer in such cases.1

    Reply, against the argumentThe firing squad differs from fine-tuning

    Sober, replying in 2009, grants that Weisberg and others persuaded him he was wrong about the firing squad. But he argues that fine-tuning differs: the prisoner might still die when the squad fires, while we were alive before we ever observed the constants, so they were already right, and observing them cannot favor design over chance.16

    Against the argumentWe have always known that life exists

    Monton argues that because we have long known that the universe permits life, the argument must judge its probabilities from the standpoint of an imagined reasoner unaware of this, and even unaware of being alive.1

    Reply, for the argumentThat framing also gives a reply to the anthropic objection

    Collins accepts this way of setting the probabilities and holds that the argument survives it. Simon Friederich, the Stanford entry's author, notes that treating our existence as evidence, rather than as background, gives defenders a direct reply to the anthropic objection.1

    Against the argumentMany universes would explain it

    If there are very many universes with differing constants, some will permit life, and observers will find themselves only in those. Physicists such as Leonard Susskind, Brian Greene, and Max Tegmark, and philosophers such as Derek Parfit, regard this inference as a rational response to fine-tuning.14

    Reply, for the argumentOther universes do not make this one likelier

    Roger White charges the inference with the "inverse gambler's fallacy" that Ian Hacking identified: like concluding, after one remarkable roll of the dice, that many earlier rolls probably occurred. Other universes, White argues, do not make this one, the only one we observe, any more likely to permit life.1

    Reply, against the argumentWe could not have seen a universe hostile to life

    Many philosophers reject the charge. P. J. McGrath, replying to Hacking's earlier version of it, argues that, unlike a gambler who could have seen any roll, we could never have found ourselves in a universe hostile to life, so we are like someone let into the casino only when the remarkable roll occurs.1

    Reply, for the argumentWe were not waiting to be called in

    White answers that the picture misleads: we were not spirits waiting outside for some universe that could hold us.1

    Reply, against the argumentNor were we watching this universe in particular

    Peter Epstein replies that neither were we spirits watching this universe in the hope that it would suit us. He argues that the charge rests on the rule that we must use all our evidence, a rule he rejects in cases like this.1

    Reply, for the argumentWe must use all our evidence

    Paul Draper, who with others has endorsed the charge, and Martin Barrett with Sober defend the rule of total evidence and reject Epstein's reply to it; Sober opposes the design argument on other grounds.1

    Reply, against the argumentA formal case for the multiverse inference

    In a systematic defense of the inference, Isaacs, Hawthorne, and Jeffrey Sandford Russell offer a formal argument that, on a wide class of methods, finding oneself in a universe that permits life gives at least some support to a multiverse.1

    5From a designer to GodThe best candidate for such a designer is God.

    For the argument

    For the argumentThe God of traditional theism is the best candidate

    Swinburne holds that the most promising candidate designer is the God of traditional theism, and that this hypothesis is simple enough to deserve a real chance of being true before the evidence is weighed.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentA designer is still far from God

    David Hume argued that even a successful design argument leaves us far from the God of tradition: flaws in nature might suggest an amateur designer or a committee of designers, the evidence could establish only finite power, and the designer would itself need explaining.5

    Where does the argument come from?

    The fine-tuning argument is a modern form of the much older argument from design, built on findings in modern physics.1 Arguments from the order of nature to a designer go back in India to the Nyaya school, as far as 100 CE, and in the West to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.4 David Hume pressed objections to them in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779).5 Each tradition's versions are described under "Across traditions" below.

    In 1961 the astrophysicist Robert Dicke explained a coincidence between large numbers in cosmology by noting that we could only exist in a cosmic era with stars like the sun. A 1974 paper introduced the anthropic principles and described Dicke's account as an anthropic explanation.1 Carr and Rees, in 1979, and John Barrow and Frank Tipler, in 1986, set out many cases of fine-tuning in works that Barnes calls classics.21

    As an argument for God, fine-tuning is usually set out in terms of probability, in versions by Rodney Holder (2002), William Lane Craig (2003), Swinburne (2004), and Collins (2009).1 Leslie treated design and a multiverse as the two reasonable candidate explanations.1 Much of the current discussion, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes, turns on the multiverse and the anthropic principle.4

    Across traditions

    Fine-tuning itself is a modern argument, but arguments from the order of nature are much older, in India and in the West.4 The paragraphs below give each faith's older arguments from order, or its teaching on creation. The sources used for this page record no discussion of fine-tuning in the modern sense by Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, or Latter-day Saint writers.

    Indian Buddhist philosophers, as Richard Hayes describes them, mostly did not reject the main argument of India's theists, that the universe is a complex product and so must have a sentient maker. They held that the shape of the universe answers to the deeds of countless beings over a beginningless history. What Vasubandhu (about 400 to 480) rejected was that a single being stands behind it, which would leave every other being powerless.7

    In Christianity, Thomas Aquinas's fifth way argues that things without intelligence act toward ends, as an arrow is aimed by an archer, so some intelligent being directs all natural things to their ends.8 William Paley's Natural Theology (1802) argued from the design of living things. Modern biology, the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry notes, regards the way living things are fitted for survival as the product of evolution.1

    From fairly early in its history, the Nyaya school of Hindu philosophy defended the existence of God (Ishvara), mainly by a design inference.9 Udayana argued that things like the earth have a maker because they are products, and Uddyotakara that primordial matter, atoms, and karma, being insentient like an axe, act only when an intelligent agent directs them.9 In Hindu devotional traditions, followers believe in a personal Lord who creates the universe and is also beyond it.10

    Buddhist, Mimamsa, and later Jain philosophers replied that the inference reaches a single, God-like maker of the world only by stretching the link between ordinary products and their makers far past experience. Nyaya thinkers such as Vacaspati Mishra answered that even ordinary reasoning from experience involves some inference to the best explanation, which allows new kinds of things to be inferred.9

    In Islam, Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126 to 1198), the Andalusian philosopher and judge, held that ordinary people should be given arguments from design, following the example of the Quran, rather than the abstract proofs of Avicenna (Ibn Sina) or of the Ash'arite theologians, which he judged neither demonstrative nor persuasive to them.11

    In Judaism, Maimonides (1138 to 1204) argued from the particular features of the world. Some features of the heavens, such as why faster spheres sit above or below slower ones, had no scientific explanation and seemed chosen rather than necessary. He took this as a reason to prefer creation by God's free choice, while granting that it was not a demonstration.12

    In Latter-day Saint teaching, God organized the universe from elements that already existed rather than creating it from nothing.13 The philosopher David L. Paulsen reads Joseph Smith as teaching that God's creative work consists of bringing order out of disorder, organizing a cosmos out of chaos.14

    Where does the debate stand?

    The debate remains open among both philosophers and physicists. Among physicists, Barnes judges the region of values that permits life likely very small, while Adams finds the habitable range quite considerable.13 The Stanford Encyclopedia's entry reports that many regard fine-tuning as the strongest version of the design argument that modern science offers, and that many physicists and philosophers regard a multiverse as a rational response to it.1 Many physicists think inflation and string theory point to a multiverse, while others, such as George Ellis, view the idea critically because it is so hard to test.1 Friederich, the entry's author, suggests that whether a multiverse can be rationally inferred from fine-tuning may have no determinate answer.1

    Common questions

    What does it mean to say the universe is fine-tuned for life?

    Fine-tuning for life, as physicists use the phrase, means that life depends on the constants of nature, and on conditions in the early universe, falling within limited ranges. If gravity had been much weaker, for example, galaxies, stars, and planets would not have formed. Physicists such as Luke Barnes and Fred Adams disagree about how narrow the ranges are.

    What is the multiverse reply to the fine-tuning argument?

    If there are very many universes with differing constants, some will permit life, and observers will find themselves only in those. Roger White answers that other universes would not make this one any more likely to permit life, a charge that P. J. McGrath and other philosophers reject. Whether a multiverse can be tested is also disputed.

    What is the anthropic objection to the fine-tuning argument?

    Elliott Sober argues that observers could only find themselves in a universe that permits life, so finding one is no evidence for a designer. Its critics answer with John Leslie's firing squad: a prisoner still alive after every marksman has fired should ask whether they meant to miss. Sober has since granted that case but argues that fine-tuning differs.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Simon Friederich. Fine-Tuning. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Luke A. Barnes. The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life. Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia 29(4), pages 529 to 564 (arXiv preprint 1112.4647), 2012. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Fred C. Adams. The Degree of Fine-Tuning in our Universe, and Others. Physics Reports 807, pages 1 to 111 (arXiv preprint 1902.03928), 2019. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. Chad Meister. Philosophy of Religion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Del Ratzsch and Jeffrey Koperski. Teleological Arguments for God's Existence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Elliott Sober. Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads. Philosophical Studies 143, pages 63 to 90 (published version, as linked from the author's University of Wisconsin page of selected papers), 2009, 83 to 86. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. Richard P. Hayes. Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), pages 5 to 28 (author's copy, University of New Mexico), 1988. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 2 (The Existence of God). New Advent (Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation, second revised edition, 1920), 1920, First Part, Question 2, Article 3, with Objection 1 and its reply. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    9. Matthew R. Dasti. Nyaya. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, introduction and section 3. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    10. John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    11. Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau. Ibn Rushd [Averroes]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    12. Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    13. Becoming Like God, Gospel Topics Essays. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.
    14. David L. Paulsen. Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil. BYU Studies 39, number 1, page 53, section "The Logical Problem of Evil". Accessed 2026-11-20.