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    The Existence of God: an argument against confident belief

    Does disagreement between religions count against belief in God?

    The debate over religious disagreement asks whether it undermines confident belief, not whether it disproves God. J. L. Schellenberg and Richard Feldman argue that, since informed, sincere people disagree and none can show they are better placed, no one should hold religious views with full confidence. Alvin Plantinga and William Alston answer that believers may reasonably hold firm.

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    The argument, step by step

    Here the argument's defenders are philosophers who hold that disagreement undermines confident religious belief, such as J. L. Schellenberg and Richard Feldman; its critics hold that believers may reasonably stand firm, such as Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. The argument concerns how confidently anyone may hold a view about God or religion, not whether God exists.

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Sincere, informed, and intelligent people hold conflicting beliefs about God and religion.
    2. Premise 2If you have no reason, acceptable to both sides, to think you are better placed than those who disagree, you should not hold your view with full confidence.
    3. Premise 3In disputes about God and religion, no side has such a reason.
    4. ConclusionSo no one is justified in holding religious beliefs, for or against God, with full confidence.

    1Premise 1Sincere, informed, and intelligent people hold conflicting beliefs about God and religion.

    What both sides acceptOn almost every religious issue, David Basinger writes in the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry, people who seem equally informed and sincere hold differing and often incompatible beliefs, within religions as well as between them. No philosopher, he adds, denies that becoming aware of such disagreement can affect believers, from mild unease to giving up a belief; the dispute is over how they ought to respond.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentNo side commands a consensus, even among experts

    Whatever stance a person takes on whether God exists, John Pittard writes in the Internet Encyclopedia's entry, they stand opposed to many highly informed and intelligent thinkers. Proponents of the argument may hold that what matters is this lack of consensus. In the 2009 PhilPapers Survey of professional philosophers at 99 leading departments, which Pittard cites, most accepted or leaned toward atheism, while most specialists in the philosophy of religion accepted or leaned toward theism.2

    Reply, against the argumentBelief in God is far more widespread

    Thomas Kelly (2011) suggests that, since belief in God is significantly more widespread than atheism, the spread of opinion gives at least slight support to theism. Pittard adds that many believers would deny that philosophical expertise is the most important qualification for judging religious questions.2

    Reply, for the argumentSpecialists may be biased

    Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols (2013) argue that specialists in the philosophy of religion are significantly influenced by pro-religious biases. If that is true, Pittard writes, it would perhaps greatly lessen the weight of their mostly theistic views.2

    Reply, against the argumentBias may run the other way

    Pittard expects that some theists would answer that selection effects and biases against theism in the wider profession help explain why atheism prevails among philosophers as a whole.2

    Against the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    2Premise 2If you have no reason, acceptable to both sides, to think you are better placed than those who disagree, you should not hold your view with full confidence.

    What both sides acceptIn David Christensen's example, two friends equally good at mental arithmetic split a restaurant bill and reach different totals. Christensen holds that neither may dismiss the disagreement by reasoning that the other's different answer shows the other to be unreliable. The question at this step is whether religious disputes are like this case.2

    For the argument

    For the argumentGive a peer's view the same weight as your own

    Adam Elga (2007) holds that when equally qualified people disagree, both should adjust their confidence until each grants that the other has equally compelling evidence. Richard Feldman (2007) argues that where neither side has reason to think the other is making a mistake, the right course for both is to suspend judgment. Others hold only that confidence should fall significantly.1

    Reply, against the argumentNo general rule settles the response

    Thomas Kelly (2013) argues that knowing how one is rationally required to respond to a disagreeing peer "will typically require an extremely substantive judgment" about one's whole situation as a knower, not the simple application of a general rule that calls for agnosticism in every such case.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWithout a neutral test, a believer may stand firm

    William Alston (1988) grants that religious diversity weakens the justification of religious belief. But where no shared, non-circular way exists to settle a dispute, as he holds is the case between religions, it is not irrational to keep believing one's own consistent perspective; the only rational course, he argues, is to sit tight with beliefs that have served well.1

    Reply, for the argumentHolding a claim true needs reasons both sides accept

    J. L. Schellenberg (2000), replying to Alston, argues that since at most one of a set of incompatible claims can be true, a disputant is justified in holding a claim true only with reasons acceptable to both sides for thinking the rivals false, and no one in religious disputes has such reasons.1

    Reply, for the argumentSitting tight is not the only rational course

    Philip Quinn (2000) agrees that sitting tight may be rational, but denies that it is the only rational course. A believer may reasonably assume, he argues, that every human grasp of the divine is shaped by culture, and on that assumption it is equally rational to revise one's beliefs toward a more inclusivist or pluralistic understanding of one's own faith.1

    Against the argumentReason may allow more than one answer

    Critics of the equal-weight principle, such as Miriam Schoenfield (2014), deny that a body of evidence always permits only one rational view. Religious questions are often cited as such a case: no single degree of confidence in God's existence, these permissivists hold, stands alone as the most rational response to the evidence.2

    Reply, for the argumentDisagreement can still show that reasoning is unreliable

    Christensen (2014) answers that even if a believer reasons perfectly rationally, wide disagreement among equally rational people could show that rational reflection on religion does not reliably reach the truth, which arguably undermines confident belief. Pittard adds that religious disagreement is so extreme, confident belief against confident disbelief, that only a very strong permissivism could cover it, a view that even philosophers inclined toward permissivism may find implausible.2

    Against the argumentA rule that defeats itself

    Alvin Plantinga (2000) argues that rules calling for conciliation are self-referentially inconsistent: philosophers also disagree about what disagreement requires, so such a rule can call for its own rejection.3

    Reply, for the argumentSelf-defeat does not show a rule is false

    Defenders of conciliatory views answer that this shows at most that, in some circumstances, such a rule cannot be reasonably believed, not that it is false. Christensen (2009) notes that a plainly sensible principle of intellectual humility faces the same result, and Elga (2010) argues that such rules, properly understood, exempt themselves.3

    Reply, against the argumentExempting a rule from itself is arbitrary

    Some, among them Simon Blessenohl (2015), answer that a conciliatory rule that exempts itself in this way is arbitrary.3

    3Premise 3In disputes about God and religion, no side has such a reason.

    For the argument

    For the argumentReligious belief rests on trusting a community

    Philip Kitcher (2014) argues that many believers form their convictions in much the same way, by trusting a community that passes on the teachings of prophets and mystics. Because this way of forming beliefs yields incompatible faiths in different cultures, he holds, it is unreliable, and even philosophically reflective believers still disagree widely. Kitcher uses the argument to support what he calls a soft atheism, and does not think it tells against secular atheism.2

    Reply, against the argumentReflective unbelief would be no safer

    Pittard writes that many believers would deny that they hold their faith by uncritical trust, and say they weigh all the evidence, including other communities' testimony, science, and philosophy. Citing Tomas Bogardus (2013), he adds that if disagreement defeats even reflective religious belief, it will be hard to maintain that explicitly irreligious belief is not threatened as well.2

    For the argumentTrust only ways of believing that everyone shares

    In The Wisdom to Doubt (2007), Schellenberg argues that we may trust without independent support only ways of forming beliefs that are nearly universal and unavoidable, such as perception and memory. Religious belief-forming is neither, and no one can give reasons acceptable to all sides for trusting one religious way over another, so religious skepticism, believing neither way, is the only rational option.2

    Reply, against the argumentThat rule reaches too far

    Alston had argued in 1991 that there is no reason to expect every way of forming beliefs that deserves trust without independent support to be common to all or most mature adults. Pittard, adapting an example from Plantinga, notes that Schellenberg's rule seems to imply that someone in colonial America strongly inclined, but not unavoidably drawn, to judge slavery abhorrent could not rationally hold that judgment without independent reasons, a conclusion Pittard calls unpalatable.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentBelievers need not grant that dissenters are their equals

    Plantinga argues that Christian exclusivists, who hold that their faith's answer to a disputed question is the true one, may grant that those who disagree have broken no rule of reasoning, yet believe they themselves have been favored, for example by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. If such beliefs are true, they are probably better placed than their critics, and Plantinga allows that the same may hold for exclusivists in other faiths.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe burden of proof falls on the believer

    Basinger (2002), who also wrote the Stanford entry, argues that unless believers can show, on grounds all rational people should accept, that dissenters are not their equals, they must treat them as equals. Most philosophers of religion, he reports, side with Plantinga's critics on this point. Some are also uneasy that the reply rests on private assurance that cannot be checked, the kind to which many extremists appeal.1

    Reply, against the argumentMisuse does not discredit every appeal

    Basinger notes that Plantinga's supporters can answer that, although some such appeals are self-serving excuses for harmful behavior, this does not show that they always or even usually are. Those who side with Plantinga, such as Joseph Kim (2011), hold that believers need not grant that dissenters are their equals unless that can be shown on grounds all rational people should accept.1

    Against the argumentFoundational beliefs need no reassessment

    Jerome Gellman (1993, 2000) argues that some religious beliefs are rock bottom: the assumed foundations on which a believer judges everything else. A believer may use them to reject competing claims, and need not reassess them unless awareness of diversity actually causes a significant loss of confidence.12

    Reply, for the argumentBeliefs that guide action need checking

    Basinger replies that many beliefs held by exclusivists guide action: some believers hold, and act on, beliefs such as that certain ethnic groups have God-given superiority or that God wants heretics silenced. Most exclusivists, he suggests, think some such actions wrong, and would want people with the beliefs behind them to reassess those beliefs even if they feel no need to. Pittard adds that a foundational belief's presumed innocence may not survive a direct challenge from other qualified thinkers.12

    Against the argumentFaiths disagree about who is qualified to judge

    Pittard argues that many religions hold their own views of what qualifies a person to judge religious claims. Some Buddhists hold that meditative discipline is needed to see the truth of the teaching that there is no personal self, and a Christian inspired by Paul's letters might hold that God-given insight matters more than scholarship. With no shared test of who is qualified, a moderate rule like Christensen's may not require much conciliation in many disputes between faiths.2

    Reply, for the argumentA partisan view of qualifications is too easy an escape

    Jennifer Lackey (2014) objects that a person should not be able to set aside disagreement merely by holding a partisan, contestable view of who is qualified, just as a sexist may not dismiss a disputant because she is a woman.2

    Reply, against the argumentNo neutral rule forbids it

    Pittard answers that believers presumably think their own theories of qualification reasonable, not prejudiced like the sexist's. A rule that forbade relying on them would have to take sides on contested religious questions, or else require giving way even to radical skeptics, and it is not clear, he writes, that any rule avoids both.2

    Reply, for the argumentDisputes within a faith still call for deference

    Even so, Pittard writes, a moderate view would call for significant deference between people who share most of their beliefs, such as two theologians who differ over finer points, so believers might need to become agnostic on many disputes within their own tradition.2

    4ConclusionSo no one is justified in holding religious beliefs, for or against God, with full confidence.

    What both sides acceptThe conclusion follows if the premises are true. It concerns how confidently a person may hold a view, not whether God exists. The responses philosophers describe to disagreement among equals range from holding firm, through lowering confidence or suspending judgment, to giving up the belief.12

    For the argument

    For the argumentThe conclusion applies to unbelief as well

    Some proponents, Pittard writes, target any confident view on disputed religious questions, atheism included. On this view, the argument tells against confident belief and confident unbelief alike.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentFaith may rest on practical reasons

    William James (1896) argued that belief is governed by two aims, to believe truth and to shun error, and that how a person weighs them may be a matter of choice. David Holley (2013) suggests that if a religious way of life is valuable, religious belief is likely to be practically rational, since living that way tends to produce it. Mikael Stenmark (2024) holds that where the evidence is about equal, practical reasons can rightly play an important and at times decisive role.21

    Reply, for the argumentDisagreement reaches practical reasons too

    Feldman and Christensen hold that rational belief in the face of disagreement must rest on objective considerations, apart from personal, practical ones. Pittard adds that people also disagree about the practical arguments for religious belief, and that this disagreement could itself make religious belief unreasonable.12

    Against the argumentDisagreement fits one reality seen in many ways

    John Hick holds that the major faiths have proved equally able to turn people from self-centeredness toward what he calls the Real, which for him undermines any one tradition's claim to supremacy. The faiths, he argues, are culturally shaped responses to one ultimate Reality, which explains why they disagree; on his view, religious belief remains rationally defensible.24

    Reply, for the argumentPluralism is one more contested view

    Pittard notes that pluralism is itself a contested religious viewpoint, so the worry disagreement raises would seem, at least at first, to apply to it as much as to any other. Critics also argue that Hick's theory is not merely about the religions but competes with them, with its own account of humanity's problem and its cure.24

    Reply, against the argumentA philosophical claim, not a religious one

    Hick answers that his claims are not themselves religious, but philosophical claims about religion. Pittard adds that, taken as evidence about the world, lasting disagreement does support pluralism more than many other religious views, since pluralism expects conversion to be rare and disagreement to persist.42

    Where does the argument come from?

    Contributions to the modern debate include Alston's "Religious Diversity and the Perceptual Knowledge of God" (1988), Hick's An Interpretation of Religion (1989), Schellenberg's reply to Alston (2000), and Feldman's "Reasonable Religious Disagreements" (2007).1 The argument draws on a wider literature on disagreement between equally qualified people in any field, including work by Kelly (2005), Christensen (2007), and Elga (2007).2 It asks whether disagreement should lower confidence in religious views, not whether it disproves God.2 Long before, David Hume (1711 to 1776) had argued in 1748 that the miracle reports of rival religions undercut one another, a point set out on the miracles page.567

    Philosophers sort responses to religious diversity into three broad views. Exclusivists hold that their own view on a disputed religious question is true, or closer to the truth than any rival; inclusivists hold that their own religion is the fullest understanding of ultimate reality, while others hold part of the truth; and pluralists deny that any one religion has primacy.1 The labels are technical. "Exclusivist" began as a polemical term, and Dale Tuggy, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, writes that the common link of pluralism with tolerance and humility, and of its rivals with arrogance, is a mere association: there seems to be no obvious logical tie between these views and those qualities.4

    Pittard distinguishes this argument from those that use the facts of disagreement as direct evidence about God. The argument from divine hiddenness does this, holding that widespread nonbelief is more to be expected if there is no God; Stephen Maitzen's version, based on how belief is spread across countries, is set out on the divine hiddenness page.28

    Across traditions

    Each faith on this page has its own teaching about other religions, and within most of them thinkers differ over how far other faiths share in the truth.4

    In the Udana, or Heartfelt Sayings, an early Buddhist collection, the Buddha hears of ascetics and wanderers of other religions who quarrel, each regarding their own view as true and the others' as silly. He tells of a king who had people blind from birth shown different parts of an elephant: one the head, another the ear, another the tail. Asked what an elephant is like, they gave different answers and came to blows. In the same way, the Buddha says, the followers of other religions quarrel because they do not understand what is true (Udana 6.4).9

    Tuggy writes that Buddhism has in general been inclusivist: many schools hold their own teaching to be truest while granting others less truth, and some texts teach that a solitary Buddha can reach enlightenment apart from Buddhist teaching. In modern times some Buddhists have built a pluralism on the Mahayana teaching of expedient means (upaya), on which teachings are aids suited to their hearers, and the Japanese Zen scholar Masao Abe proposed a pluralism that some critics describe as inclusivist.4

    Christian churches have held each of these views. The Catholic Church has long taught that there is no salvation outside the Church, and until the mid-nineteenth century, Tuggy writes, this was most often read strictly: the Council of Florence (1442) applied it not only to heretics but to Jews and all others outside the Church. A papal statement of 1854, Singulari Quadam, held that people invincibly ignorant of the true religion bear no guilt for it before God.4 The Second Vatican Council's declaration Nostra Aetate (1965) says that "The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions," while adding that the Church must proclaim Christ, in whom people may find the fullness of religious life.10 Many Catholic theologians since have held inclusivist views.4 Karl Rahner argued that people of other faiths who practice in good conscience what is good in their religion may be saved through Christ without knowing it, as "anonymous Christians."41

    Protestants range from restrictivists, who hold that explicit knowledge of the gospel is necessary for salvation, to inclusivists close to Rahner, and theologically liberal Protestants most often hold some form of pluralism.4 In January 2020 the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Church of Constantinople approved for publication a statement of Orthodox social teaching prepared by a commission of theologians whom Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew had appointed; after further additions and editing, the commission published it as For the Life of the World.11 It states that the Orthodox Church understands itself to be "the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church."11 It also affirms that God's Logos, or Word, speaks to all hearts through conscience, and that "wherever truth is revered the Spirit of God is at work," while holding that the Church's understanding of the truth differs from that of other religious traditions in many ways that cannot be reconciled.1112

    Modern Hindu thought, Tuggy writes, is usually pluralistic, though some strands of the tradition have been exclusivist, some Hindus object to pluralism, and Hindu pluralists often also hold that Hinduism is greatly superior to other religions in various ways.4 Ramakrishna (1836 to 1886), as the order named for him describes his message, taught that all religions are true in so far as they lead to the same ultimate goal, though he did not say that all religions are the same.13 His disciple Vivekananda (1863 to 1902) told the Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 that, in the Hindu view, the contradictions between religions are only apparent: "It is the same light coming through glasses of different colours."141513

    Dancing with Siva, a catechism published by the Himalayan Academy and designed, typeset, and illustrated by the monks (swamis) of the Saiva Siddhanta Yoga Order, teaches that truth is one and paths are many, and that Shaivas, who worship Shiva as the Supreme Being, respect all who believe in God. It adds that all religions are not the same, that their doctrines often conflict, and that Shaivas defend their own faith and avoid the enchantment of other ways.1617

    The Quran teaches that God appointed a law and a way for each community, that he could have made all people one community but tests them by what he has given them, and that they should vie with one another in good works, since all will return to God, who will tell them of the things in which they differed (5:48).18 Tuggy writes that Islam, like Judaism, has tended toward inclusivist views. In the traditional Islamic perspective, Islam, in the sense of submission to God, was taught by all earlier prophets, whose followers truly submitted to God, though the teachings of Muhammad, as the seal of the prophets, should and one day will supersede all earlier ones.4

    Muslim thinkers differ over the salvation of others. Basinger describes Muslim exclusivists, for whom salvation often requires belief in God's oneness, acceptance of Muhammad as the final messenger, life according to the Quran, and the other pillars of Islam, and Muslim inclusivists such as Morteza Mutahhari, who held that people who seek the truth, but from whom the reality of Islam is hidden through no fault of their own, are "dispositional Muslims" who will receive the grace they need for salvation.1 Recent Muslim thinkers have reached conclusions parallel to Rahner's, Tuggy writes, while criticizing pluralist theories as amounting to unbelief (kufr), and whether Sufis such as Rumi (1207 to 1273) and Ibn Arabi (1165 to 1240) held a form of pluralism is disputed.4

    Traditional Jewish teaching, as the Orthodox Union summarizes it, holds that God gave seven commandments to all humanity, the descendants of Noah, and 613 commandments to the Jewish people.19 Maimonides (1138 to 1204) taught that a non-Jew who accepts the seven and keeps them carefully, because God commanded them in the Torah, is counted among the pious of the nations and has a share in the world to come.2021 Tuggy writes that Jewish thinkers have usually held inclusivist rather than exclusivist views of other religions, and that since the late twentieth century some have argued for pluralism, revising traditional Jewish theology.4

    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints holds that it is the only church on the whole earth that is both true and living, as a revelation in the Doctrine and Covenants describes it (Doctrine and Covenants 1:30).22 Its scripture also teaches that the Spirit of Christ is given to every person, so that they may know good from evil (Moroni 7:16).22 The Latter-day Saint church teaches that this Light of Christ is an influence for good in the lives of all people, and leads them toward the true gospel.23 It also teaches that people who did not know the gospel in this life are taught it in the spirit world after death, where they may accept it, along with ordinances performed for them in temples.24

    Where does the debate stand?

    Philosophers remain divided over how much religious disagreement should shake confident belief.2 Schellenberg, Feldman, and Kitcher argue that it undermines confident religious belief, and Robert McKim commends holding such beliefs more tentatively; Plantinga, Alston, and Gellman argue that believers may reasonably stand firm, and Kelly that no general rule settles how to respond.12 The argument's reach is itself disputed: some of its defenders apply it to confident atheism as well, while Kitcher aims it only at religious belief.2 Pittard concludes that for many thinkers, including many religious believers, the sense that lasting disagreement challenges religious belief is very strong, but that settling how far it reaches depends on contested questions, both about disagreement and about the place of religious belief among a believer's other beliefs.2

    Common questions

    Does religious disagreement show that God does not exist?

    Not in the argument set out here. It asks whether disagreement should lower anyone's confidence in religious views, and some of its defenders apply it to confident atheism as well. A different argument, from divine hiddenness, treats widespread nonbelief as evidence that there is no God.

    What are religious exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism?

    They are technical labels for responses to religious diversity. Exclusivists hold that their own view on a disputed religious question is true; inclusivists, that their religion is the fullest understanding of ultimate reality while others hold part of the truth; and pluralists deny that any one religion has primacy. Each view has adherents in many faiths.

    Why do some philosophers say believers may hold firm?

    William Alston argues that where no neutral way exists to settle a dispute between religions, it is not irrational to keep one's own consistent view. Alvin Plantinga holds that believers may reasonably think themselves better placed than those who disagree, and Jerome Gellman that foundational beliefs need no reassessment unless confidence is actually shaken.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. David Basinger. Religious Diversity (Pluralism). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. John Pittard. Religious Disagreement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Bryan Frances and Jonathan Matheson. Disagreement. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024, section 5.5.1. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. Dale Tuggy. Theories of Religious Diversity. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. C. M. Lorkowski. David Hume: Religion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, opening section. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Timothy McGrew and Robert Larmer. Miracles. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X: Of Miracles. Hume Texts Online (davidhume.org), 1748, Section X, Parts 1 and 2. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    8. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Adam Green. Hiddenness of God. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    9. Bhikkhu Sujato (translator). Heartfelt Sayings 6.4: Followers of Various Other Religions (1st). SuttaCentral (bilara-data repository), segments 1.3 to 33.4. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    10. Second Vatican Council, proclaimed by Pope Paul VI. Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate). The Holy See, 1965, section 2. Accessed 2026-11-04.
    11. A special commission of theologians appointed by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church. Ecumenical Patriarchate (copy hosted at stsuots.edu, the website of St. Sophia Ukrainian Orthodox Seminary), 2020, Preface and paragraph 55. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    12. A commission of Orthodox theologians, for the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church. Ecumenical Patriarchate; Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2020, paragraphs 55 and 58. Accessed 2026-11-04.
    13. Ramakrishna Math and Ramakrishna Mission. Sri Ramakrishna. Belur Math (Ramakrishna Math and Ramakrishna Mission), sections "Following Other Faiths" and "Message of Sri Ramakrishna". Accessed 2026-11-04.
    14. Vivekananda. Paper on Hinduism, read at the Parliament of Religions, Chicago, September 19, 1893. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, volume 1, hosted at ramakrishnavivekananda.info, 1893. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    15. Helen De Cruz. Religion and Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    16. Sivaya Subramuniyaswami. Dancing with Siva: Hinduism's Contemporary Catechism, sixth edition: Sloka 12, How Do Saivites Regard Other Faiths?. Himalayan Academy (web edition), 2003, Sloka 12, How Do Saivites Regard Other Faiths?. Accessed 2026-11-04.
    17. Marmaduke Pickthall. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: An Explanatory Translation. Alfred A. Knopf, 1930. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    18. OU Staff. Mitzvah. Orthodox Union, 2006. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    19. Maimonides. Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars, chapter 8. Sefaria (trans. Eliyahu Touger, Moznaim), 8:11. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    20. Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    21. The Book of Mormon (1920 edition), the Doctrine and Covenants and the Pearl of Great Price (1921 editions). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1920. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    22. Light of Christ, Topics and Questions (2023). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    23. Spirit World, Topics and Questions (2025). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.