The Existence of God: an argument for God
Is religious experience evidence for God?
The argument from religious experience holds that experiences which seem to their subjects to be of God are, like sense experiences, good grounds for belief unless there is reason to doubt them. Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Alvin Plantinga defend versions of it. Critics question the likeness to perception, point to conflicting experiences across faiths, and offer natural explanations.
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The argument, step by step
The argument, as its defenders state it:
- Premise 1Religious experiences are like sense experiences in every respect that matters.
- Premise 2Sense experiences are excellent grounds for beliefs about the physical world.
- ConclusionSo religious experiences are excellent grounds for religious beliefs.
1Premise 1Religious experiences are like sense experiences in every respect that matters.
What both sides acceptMark Webb, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, describes religious experiences as experiences that seem to the person having them to be of some objective reality with religious meaning. Perhaps most, he writes, are visions and voices perceived not through the bodily eyes or ears; others are ordinary sights that seem to carry something more, or experiences said to be beyond words. Webb notes that the defenses of William Alston and Alvin Plantinga are not simple arguments from analogy: only likenesses and differences that bear on knowledge count, for the argument or against it.1
For the argument
For the argumentWhat seems to be present probably is
Richard Swinburne's Principle of Credulity holds that a person is justified in believing that what seems to be present really is present, unless some specific reason for doubt, called a defeater, applies. He argues that the defeaters that undercut ordinary perceptions do not always apply to religious experience. To reject the argument, Webb writes, a critic would have to show that one always, or almost always, does.1
Reply, against the argumentConflicting reports undercut credulity
Richard Jones and Jerome Gellman, the authors of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on mysticism, argue that the divergence among mystics' own claims damages the idea that those claims should be accepted under a principle of credulity. Some of the claims contradict one another on the basic nature of what is experienced: a personal God, for example, or an impersonal Brahman.2
For the argumentExperiences of God have the shape of perception
Defenders of what is called the argument from experience, among them Gellman, William Wainwright, and Keith Yandell, stress that experiences of God have a subject and an object, and move people to make claims about what they experienced. Others can take up a suitable spiritual path to try to check those claims. Agreement among people of different places, times, and traditions adds weight, they argue, and so, Wainwright holds, do good fruits in the person's life.2
Reply, against the argumentAgreement and good fruits are less clear than they seem
Jones and Gellman note that what one mystical tradition counts as good fruit another may not. William James, they add, found that the supposed agreement among mystics largely disappears once the wider mass of reports is taken seriously.2
Against the argument
Against the argumentReligious experiences cannot be cross-checked
Evan Fales argues that every successful practice of perception needs ways to cross-check what it reports, such as testing causes and finding mechanisms, and that experiences of a reality beyond nature have none. Richard Gale argues that experiences of God lack agreement among perceivers, and any way to check whether the perceiver was in the right state for a true experience.2
Reply, for the argumentEach kind of experience can have its own confirmation
Against the argumentNothing could show an experience of God false
William Rowe observes that God may choose to reveal himself to one person and not to another, so when others in the same conditions have no such experience, that does not count against it. Then, he argues, there is no way to tell when an experience of God is false, and so no way to credit one as genuine.2
Against the argumentThe religious meaning may be added afterward
Wayne Proudfoot and Ann Taves hold that no experience is religious in itself. Taves argues that people have experiences that afterward strike them as special, and only then, depending on various factors, give them a religious meaning. In the same spirit, William Forgie argues that an experience can present only general features, not features that mark its object as God, just as seeing one of two identical twins cannot show which one you see.2
Reply, for the argumentPerception can single out its object
Nelson Pike argues against Forgie that singling out a particular object can be part of what an experience presents, drawing on examples from sense perception.2
Against the argumentGod cannot be told apart by place and time
Gale and Peter Byrne argue that there could never be evidence that a person perceived God. To show that perceptions share one object, they hold, one must be able to tell that object from similar ones by its place in space and time, and God has no such place.2
Reply, for the argumentGod may be identified within a practice of its own
Gellman argues that we identify physical objects through a whole practice that weighs features and positions together, and that nothing obvious rules out identifying God within a practice of its own, with its own standards.2
2Premise 2Sense experiences are excellent grounds for beliefs about the physical world.
For the argument
For the argumentWe trust our basic ways of forming beliefs without outside proof
Alston argues that sense perception and our other basic ways of forming beliefs cannot be shown reliable without relying on their own results. It is rational to trust them, he holds, because they are firmly established, woven into the rest of life, and do not produce massive contradictions. He argues that the Christian practice of forming beliefs from religious experience has the same features, and so deserves the same trust.12
For the argumentBeliefs from experiences of God can be basic too
Plantinga argues that we treat beliefs formed from sense experience as basic, needing no further support. Beliefs formed when God seems to show himself to a person, which he calls M-beliefs, deserve the same standing; on his theory of warrant, they are warranted if they are true, so critics cannot dismiss them without asking whether they are true.1
Against the argument
Against the argumentPractical good sense is not proof of reliability
Jonathan Kvanvig faults Alston for using "rationality" loosely, arguing that no single meaning of the word can do all the work Alston gives it. Others object that Alston moves from saying it is practically rational to take part in the Christian practice to saying it is rational to believe that the practice is reliable.2
Against the argumentThe practice's own checks may be biased
Alston's Christian practice tests each belief against scripture, Christian doctrine, and guidelines drawn from the history of Christian mysticism. Gellman, who himself defends an argument from experience, argues that those guidelines were compromised by bias centered on men and by outdated scientific beliefs, which detracts from the practice's standing as a source of knowledge.2
3ConclusionSo religious experiences are excellent grounds for religious beliefs.
What both sides acceptWebb notes that the same questions arise for experiences of Brahman, of emptiness, or of the Dao as for experiences of God, and that the answers given in defense of theistic experience are open to defenders of these other experiences too.1
For the argument
For the argumentThe whole of experience, not single moments
Kai-Man Kwan treats experience of God as a well-established type: it comes to many people on repeated occasions, shares a common view of what exists, and can be communicated within a coherent framework. He weighs it together with moral, aesthetic, interpersonal, and intellectual experience, among others, and Jones and Gellman write that this approach avoids objections drawn from the differences with sense perception and from neuroscience.2
Against the argument
Against the argumentExperiences in different faiths conflict
Webb writes that religious diversity counts, at first sight, against these experiences much as wildly conflicting eyewitness reports undermine one another. Some people report experiencing nothingness as the ultimate reality, some a vast impersonal consciousness in which all share, and some a perfect, personal creator.1
Reply, for the argumentOne reality, experienced in different ways
John Hick holds that these experiences are of one and the same reality, which different people experience in different ways. Gellman proposes a similar view.1
Reply, against the argumentThe contradictions remain
Webb replies that such views leave the problem untouched: if different practices yield experiences whose contents contradict one another, one of the practices must be unreliable.1
Reply, for the argumentInsiders may see what outsiders cannot
Alston and Plantinga argue that a person inside a tradition gains resources that outsiders lack, as a traveler who reaches the heart of a jungle sees what others cannot. So it can be reasonable to hold that some are right and others wrong, they argue, even though, as both grant, people in other traditions can make the same argument.1
Against the argumentNatural causes may explain the experiences
Sigmund Freud held that religious experiences could be explained by psychological mechanisms rooted in early childhood, and Karl Marx traced religious belief to economic forces; Webb notes that few now hold either theory, though something like them might be true. More recently, some point out that brain events in meditation and other religious experiences closely resemble those in certain seizures and mental disorders, or under drugs, and argue that there is nothing more to the experiences. Many who study the brain basis of religious experience draw that conclusion, Webb reports, though some, such as Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg, do not.1
Reply, for the argumentEvery experience has a brain state
Gellman points out that most such explanations, such as the psychoanalytic and social ones, are hypotheses offered by people who first assume that the experiences are not genuine. Robert Ellwood notes that every experience, whatever its source, comes with a matching brain state, so the same reasoning would make sense experience an illusion as well.1
Reply, against the argumentA rival explanation still weakens the case
Jones and Gellman, though they hold that brain science alone is neutral between natural and transcendent explanations, write that plausible natural explanations still weaken the religious case by offering a reasonable alternative. Matthew Bagger argues that modern inquirers should reject any supernatural explanation of mystical experience in principle, as they reject miracles.2
Reply, for the argumentA defensible case, not a proof
Jones and Gellman answer that most defenders offer the argument as "at best a defensible line of reasoning," not a proof that should convince everyone. To defeat it, they write, critics would have to show that it is actually irrational, in our present situation, to reject naturalism, the view that nature is all there is.2
Reply, for the argumentSeizures are a poor match
Jones and Gellman report that ecstatic experiences of well-being and certainty occur in only 1 to 2 percent of patients with temporal lobe seizures, according to a 2008 paper, and that the experiences these seizures bring usually last only a few seconds within a longer episode and usually bring fear and anxiety rather than joy. A study of medieval Christian mystics and ascetics, they add, found no evidence of major mental illness. Illness may trigger some such experiences, they conclude, but it is not a total explanation.2
Against the argumentEvidence for the one who has it, not for others
William James held that mystical experiences can be authoritative grounds for belief for the person who has them, but cannot give grounds to a person who hears them reported. Luc Bovens has expanded on this view and explained it.1
Reply, for the argumentReports may work like other testimony
Webb holds that, if the experiences justify the person who has them, reports of them most naturally work like reports of ordinary experience: they may compel belief, permit it, or give no grounds, depending on the case. The two kinds of experience differ in clarity, detail, and rival explanations, he grants, but it is not clear that the differences are great enough to rule out religious testimony always and everywhere.1
Where does the argument come from?
Philosophers have defended versions of the argument since at least the 1930s, among them John Baillie, in Our Knowledge of God (1939), and C. D. Broad.2 Webb notes that many religious experiences came unsought, such as those their traditions record of Moses, Paul, Muhammad, and Arjuna, whose encounter with Krishna the Bhagavad Gita describes.1 William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) turned philosophers' attention to mystical experiences as possible sources of knowledge.21
Friedrich Schleiermacher's idea of a feeling of absolute dependence and Rudolf Otto's feeling of the numinous were important early contributions to the study of such experiences.1 For Otto, William Mander explains, whatever is holy, or numinous, is counted so because of our experience of it, which is neither rational nor sensory, rather than because of its own features.3 Later writers, among them Alston and Gellman, argued that there is more to religious experience than feeling.1
Webb finds the argument, or one very like it, in Swinburne's The Existence of God (1979), Alston's Perceiving God (1991), Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (2000) and an earlier paper of 1981, and Harold Netland's Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God (2022).1 Among the early critics, C. B. Martin concluded in 1955 that claims to have experienced God are very close to subjective reports of how things seem, rather than objective reports of what is there.2 Later critics include Rowe (1982), Michael Martin (1990), Gale (1991), Bagger (1999), and Fales.2
Across traditions
The faiths differ over what such experiences are of.1 Classical mystics in general, Jones and Gellman write, did not take their experiences to verify the teachings of their scriptures; rather, the scriptures vouched for genuine experiences.2
Buddhism. In the traditions that began in India, Buddhism among them, Webb explains, the object of religious experience is a basic feature of reality rather than a being separate from the universe.1 In Theravada Buddhism, the goal of insight (vipassana) meditation is to see things as they are: unsatisfactory, impermanent, and not-self.1 Seeing reality this way extinguishes the fires of craving and frees the meditator from rebirth, and at the moment of that insight nirvana is reached; in all Mahayana schools, Webb writes, enlightenment comes from directly realizing that emptiness (sunyata) is a fundamental feature of reality.1 Caroline Franks Davis argues that mystics of every tradition really experience a loving presence with whom one can have a personal relationship.2 Jones and Gellman reply that, to hold this, she must twist Buddhist accounts, reading the Buddha as experiencing God in states of meditative concentration (jhanas) without knowing it.2
Christianity. Classical Christian mystics, Jones and Gellman write, usually described becoming one with God as a loving union of their wills with God's, or even a fusion of their minds with God's; Bernard of Clairvaux (1090 to 1153) called it a mutuality of love.2 The Catholic mystic Teresa of Avila held that one can tell whether an experience comes from God or from the Devil by its fruits in action and character, by how vividly it is remembered, by whether it agrees with Christian scripture, and by the confirmation of church superiors.24 For her, Jones and Gellman write, mystical experiences as such carried no special authority.2
Hinduism. John Carman writes that in the devotional traditions, whether centered on Vishnu, on Shiva, or on the Goddess, whom her devotees regard as the supreme power, the path of devotion (bhakti) leads toward "a state of abiding communion with a personally conceived ultimate reality."5 He describes bhakti as "the divine-human relationship as experienced from the human side."5 Devotees speak of times when they feel united with God, which alternate with times of painful separation, and in many schools they put their sense of God's absence into intense and beautiful poetry.5
Many important Hindu experiences, Webb writes, are of Brahman and its identity with the self.1 Advaita Vedanta, as Shankara taught it, holds that a person's essence (atman) is identical with Brahman, the only reality there is, so the self does not merge into Brahman: there was only one reality all along.2 Advaitins, Jones and Gellman report, regard experiences of a personal God as ones in which the mind is not yet clear of illusion.2 Ramanuja (1017 to 1137 by traditional accounts), who gave Vedanta a theistic reading, held against Advaita that Brahman is a God of countless auspicious qualities, not a reality without qualities.6
Islam. Al-Ghazali (about 1056 to 1111), one of the most influential theologians of Sunni Islam, changed his way of life under the influence of Sufi writings and later founded a Sufi convent in his hometown.7 In his autobiography, Deliverance from Error, he writes that the Sufis' most distinctive trait is gained not by study but by direct experience, as knowing the definition of health differs from being healthy.8 He names three levels of knowing their states: proof by demonstration, direct experience, and faith, which accepts the reports of others, for example by keeping company with Sufis.8 The closeness to God that the Sufis reach, he holds, is wrongly described as God dwelling in them or as union with God.8 Frank Griffel writes that, for al-Ghazali, the inspiration (ilham) of Sufi masters stands between prophecy and ordinary knowing and is one of the most important sources of knowledge.7
Judaism. Judah Halevi (died 1141), in the Kuzari, held that the signs of God's presence are known through experience, much of it shared by a whole people, rather than through the arguments of philosophers.9 For prophecy, Halevi described inner senses, among them one called taste (dawq), a term familiar from Sufi literature, through which prophets perceived what the philosophers' reasoning could not.9 Jones and Gellman give an example from the Kabbalah, a Jewish mystical tradition, of experience giving a teaching new meaning: Kabbalists came to understand the commandment (mitzvah) as "joining" or "connection" with God. In their words, "Starting with 'commandment,' the mystic ends up with 'clinging' (devekut) to God."2 In the sixteenth century, Michael Swartz writes, Isaac Luria and other teachers in Safed built a system in which performing a commandment, joined with meditation on divine names, could bring redemption, and that system gave worshipers a powerful motive to keep the commandments.10
The Latter-day Saint faith. The faith traces its beginning to Joseph Smith's account that God the Father and Jesus Christ appeared to him in a grove of trees in western New York when he was about 14 years old.11 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teaches that revelation is communication from God, and that while scripture tells of visions, dreams, and angels, most revelation to leaders and members comes through quiet promptings of the Holy Ghost, felt more than heard, which speak to the mind and heart and bring peace.12 The Book of Mormon's introduction invites every reader to ask God whether the book is true, and teaches that those who ask in faith will gain a testimony of its truth by the power of the Holy Ghost (Moroni 10:3-5).13 The Latter-day Saint church's essay on the First Vision holds that neither its truth nor the arguments against it can be established by historical research alone, and that a seeker who asks God in sincere prayer can learn its truth through the Holy Ghost.11
Where does the debate stand?
Swinburne, Alston, Plantinga, Gellman, and Kwan have defended versions of the argument, while Fales, Gale, Rowe, Bagger, and Michael Martin have argued against it.12 Defenders differ among themselves, Jones and Gellman report, over how strong the first evidence from experience is.2 They add that the variety of experiences across traditions raises the question of how much in them is given and how much is interpretation drawn from a tradition's beliefs, while noting that most defenders offer the argument as "at best a defensible line of reasoning," not a proof that should convince everyone.2
Common questions
What is the argument from religious experience?
It holds that religious experiences are like sense experiences in every respect that matters. Since sense experiences are excellent grounds for beliefs about the physical world, religious experiences are excellent grounds for religious beliefs. Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Alvin Plantinga defend versions of it; critics question the likeness to perception and offer other explanations.
What is the principle of credulity?
It is Richard Swinburne's principle that a person is justified in believing that what seems to be present really is present, unless a specific reason for doubt, called a defeater, applies. Swinburne argues that the defeaters that undercut ordinary perceptions do not always apply to religious experience, so religious experiences can justify belief.
Can science explain religious experiences?
Some argue that brain events during religious experiences resemble those in certain seizures, disorders, or drug states, so nothing more is needed. Defenders answer that every experience has a matching brain state, and Richard Jones and Jerome Gellman report that ecstatic experiences are rare in seizures. Critics reply that a plausible natural explanation still weakens the religious case.
Read next
Sources
- Mark Webb. Religious Experience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Richard Jones and Jerome Gellman. Mysticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- William Mander. Pantheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- Thomas Hopko. The Orthodox Faith, Volume III, Church History: Sixteenth Century, The West. Orthodox Church in America, 1981. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
- al-Ghazali, trans. Richard J. McCarthy. Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalal), in Freedom and Fulfillment. Twayne (1980); online at ghazali.org, 1980, section "The True Nature of Prophecy" and following. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Ehud Krinis. Judah Halevi. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026, sections 1 and 6.2.1. Accessed 2026-10-28.
- Michael Swartz. Judaism: An Overview. Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed. (Macmillan Reference USA), via Encyclopedia.com, 2005. Accessed 2026-10-29.
- First Vision Accounts, Gospel Topics Essays. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.
- Revelation, Topics and Questions (2023). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.
- The Book of Mormon: Introduction. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Accessed 2026-10-28.