See all results on the search page

    The Existence of God: an argument for God

    Why is there something rather than nothing? The argument from contingency

    The argument from contingency holds that things which could have failed to exist need an explanation beyond themselves, so a being must exist that cannot fail to exist. Defenders from Avicenna and Leibniz to Alexander Pruss take it to be God. Critics question whether every contingent thing, and the universe itself, needs an explanation, and whether that being is God.

    • 16 minute read
    • Last reviewed:

    The argument, step by step

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1Something contingent exists: something that exists but could have failed to exist.
    2. Premise 2Every contingent thing has a complete explanation of its existence.
    3. Premise 3Contingent things alone cannot give that complete explanation, since none can explain itself.
    4. ConclusionTherefore, a necessary being exists: one that, if it exists, cannot fail to exist.
    5. From a necessary being to GodThe universe is made only of contingent things, so the necessary being is something other than the universe: God.

    1Premise 1Something contingent exists: something that exists but could have failed to exist.

    What both sides acceptThat particular things are contingent is generally undisputed, the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry notes, not least because we are mortal. Whether the universe as a whole is contingent is another question, which the entry says deserves serious defense. Some versions of the argument begin from things within the world, as Thomas Aquinas's does; others, such as Richard Swinburne's, begin from the universe itself.1

    For the argument

    For the argumentIf God is possible, the universe could have failed to exist

    William Rowe offers an argument that the universe is contingent. On the classical idea of God, who is free to create or not, it is necessary that if God exists, it is possible that no dependent beings exist; since it is possible that God exists, he argues, it is possible that there are no dependent beings at all.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentWhat is true of the parts need not be true of the whole

    Bertrand Russell charges the move from contingent parts to a contingent universe with the fallacy of composition: concluding that a whole has a property because each of its parts has it. We may ask for the causes of particular things, he holds, but not for a cause of the universe on that basis.1

    Reply, for the argumentSome wholes share the nature of their parts

    Bruce Reichenbach, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry, grants that part-whole arguments can commit the fallacy, but notes that it turns on content: a wall of small bricks need not be small, yet a wall of clay bricks is clay. The universe, theists argue, is like the second case: if all its contingent contents, matter and energy included, ceased to exist at once, it would cease to exist too.1

    Against the argumentSomething contingent might exist in every possible world

    Rowe argues that a similar step in Samuel Clarke's argument is fallacious. Even if each contingent thing fails to exist in some possible world (some complete way the world could be), there may be no possible world that lacks every contingent thing, in which case, though each thing is contingent, something must exist.12

    Reply, for the argumentAquinas reasons about dependence, not time

    John Haldane defends the reasoning of Aquinas's Third Way, which holds that if everything can fail to exist, at one time nothing existed: it fails, he argues, only on a reading in time. Aquinas does not hold that over time there would be nothing, Haldane argues, but that if every contingent thing in the order of causes holding things in being did not exist, there would be nothing.1

    2Premise 2Every contingent thing has a complete explanation of its existence.

    What both sides acceptThis premise is a form of the principle of sufficient reason, which the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on that principle describes as the demand that everything have a reason, cause, or ground. The principle is really a family of principles, from a demand that every fact have an explanation to versions limited to contingent things. A complete explanation, in the sense Swinburne and Alexander Pruss use, leaves nothing puzzling unaccounted for.31

    For the argument

    For the argumentScience presupposes the principle

    Pruss and Robert Koons argue that the principle is needed to make the universe intelligible. Calling something a brute fact, a fact with no explanation, should be a last resort, Pruss writes, since it would undercut the practice of science; on this view, the best explanation of science's success is that the principle tracks how reality works.1

    Reply, against the argumentA rule of method, not a truth about reality

    Critics reply that such reasoning gives the principle only a practical justification, as a method, not a reason to think reality obeys it. J. L. Mackie argues that we have no right to assume that the universe fits our preference for causal order; science could work just as well starting from brute facts.1

    For the argumentA weaker principle may be enough

    Richard Gale and Pruss build an argument on a weak principle of sufficient reason: that it is possible for every true statement to have an explanation. From it they argue to a necessary being who freely brings it about that the world exists.1

    Reply, against the argumentThe weak principle implies the strong one

    Graham Oppy argues that the weak principle, once granted, implies the strong one, so a critic who rejects the strong principle has no reason to accept the weak one.1

    Reply, for the argumentIts conclusion alone is no reason to reject it

    Gale and Pruss grant that the weak principle implies the strong one, but reply that the only ground for rejecting it is that it leads to a theistic conclusion, which is not an independent reason.1

    Reply, against the argumentReasons against theism count against the principle

    Oppy maintains that critics may have granted the weak principle without seeing what it implies, and that other grounds for thinking theism false give a reason to reject it.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe universe is just there

    Russell, in a 1948 debate with Frederick Copleston, denied that the universe needs an explanation: it is "just there, and that's all." Following David Hume, he argued that since we get the idea of a cause from particular things, we cannot ask for the cause of something like the universe, which we cannot experience.1

    Reply, for the argumentA general rule need not rest on every case

    Koons answers that we need not experience every case to know a general principle: to know that a ball dropped by a tuba player will fall, one needs no sample of tuba players dropping balls. In the same way, he argues, we can know that the universe needs a cause or explanation.1

    Reply, against the argumentThe universe is unlike anything we experience

    Wes Morriston responds that the universe is very different from the things we have in mind when we say nothing comes into existence without a cause: tuba players are nothing like the initial singularity of Big Bang theory.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe universe and its contents are both contingent

    Defenders of the argument answer that the universe and its contents share the feature that matters: both are contingent, so both need a complete explanation, whether or not the universe is eternal.1

    Against the argumentAn event without a cause can be conceived

    Hume argued that the causal principle is not known by reason alone, since we can conceive of an event without conceiving of its cause, and what is conceivable is possible. Mackie and Immanuel Kant add that what holds within the world cannot be extended to the world as a whole.1

    Reply, for the argumentConceivable is not the same as possible

    Reichenbach replies that what someone can conceive need not be possible: one can conceive of separating the heads side of a coin from the tails side, though they cannot be separated. Hume, he writes, seems to confuse the limits of what we know with the limits of what can be.1

    Against the argumentNo explanation could cover every contingent truth

    Peter van Inwagen argues that the principle is false. Take the conjunction of all true contingent statements: its explanation cannot be contingent, since it would then be part of what needs explaining, and it cannot be necessary, since only necessary truths follow from necessary ones.1

    Reply, for the argumentA free choice explains without necessitating

    Pruss replies that a reason can explain something sufficiently without logically entailing it. God is a necessary being, he argues, but is linked to the world through free agency, and a free action explains a contingent state of affairs without making it necessary.1

    3Premise 3Contingent things alone cannot give that complete explanation, since none can explain itself.

    What both sides acceptThe argument holds that nothing can explain its own existence, since it would have to exist already to do so, and that a complete explanation must either draw only on contingent things or include a necessary one. For many critics, the Stanford Encyclopedia's entry reports, this premise and the principle of sufficient reason are where the argument succeeds or fails.1

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentExplain each part and the whole is explained

    In Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character Cleanthes argues that in a chain of causes each member is explained by the one before it. Uniting the members into a whole, he holds, is an arbitrary act of the mind: once the cause of each of twenty particles of matter is shown, it is unreasonable to ask for the cause of the twenty.41

    Reply, for the argumentWhy there are dependent things at all

    Rowe rejects what he calls the Hume-Edwards principle, after Hume and Paul Edwards: explaining each dependent thing by another, he argues, is one thing, and explaining why there are dependent things at all is another. Pruss adds, with Joshua Rasmussen, that an endless chain of chickens and eggs, each accounting for the next, explains no chicken or egg in it.1

    Reply, against the argumentExplaining each member explains them all

    Thomas Oberle defends the Hume-Edwards principle against the charge of circularity. Taken member by member rather than as one collection, he argues, each contingent fact can be explained by others, even to infinity, and then all of them are explained.1

    Reply, for the argumentSomething beyond the parts is needed

    Swinburne holds that an explanation is complete only when going beyond it would add no explanatory power. Gale concludes that to explain the parts of the universe and how they are joined, we must appeal to something other than those parts.1

    Reply, against the argumentThat assumes the facts must be explained as one collection

    Oberle responds that this again assumes the contingent facts must be explained as one collection, a demand he finds unsupported.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe demand for a complete explanation remains

    Reichenbach answers that Oberle's reply still leaves open Swinburne's and Pruss's demand for a complete explanation of each contingent thing.1

    4ConclusionTherefore, a necessary being exists: one that, if it exists, cannot fail to exist.

    What both sides acceptThe Stanford Encyclopedia's entry notes that the conclusion follows validly from the premises before it. What "necessary" means here is disputed: logical necessity, like the impossibility of a four-sided triangle, or factual necessity, the necessity of a being that depends on nothing else and can neither begin nor cease to exist.1

    For the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Against the argument

    Against the argument"Necessary existence" has no consistent meaning

    In Hume's Dialogues, Cleanthes argues that whatever we can conceive as existing we can also conceive as not existing, so no being's existence can be demonstrated, and the words "necessary existence" have no consistent meaning. J. J. C. Smart argued in 1955 that a logically necessary being is an absurd idea, since logical necessity belongs to statements, not to beings.41

    Reply, for the argumentA factually necessary being

    John Hick distinguishes factual necessity from logical necessity. A factually necessary being, as Reichenbach and Swinburne also describe it, neither came into existence nor can cease to exist, and depends on nothing else for its existence.1

    Reply, against the argumentThen one may ask why God exists

    Mackie replies that if God's necessity is only factual, God's existence is logically contingent, so one can ask why God exists, and the principle of sufficient reason applies to God as well. Timothy O'Connor objects in the same vein that such a being would just happen to exist.1

    Reply, for the argumentAsking what created God is out of place

    Swinburne agrees that God, though factually necessary, is logically contingent, but holds that the principle of sufficient reason concerns factual, not logical, contingency, so no reason is owed for a factually necessary being. On such grounds Stephen Davis holds that Stephen Hawking's question "Who created God?" is out of place.1

    Against the argumentThe argument leans on the ontological argument

    Kant argued that the argument needs a second step to say what the necessary being is, and that the only concept fit for that, a most real being, brings in the ontological argument, the attempt to prove God's existence from the idea of God alone, which he held defective.1

    Reply, for the argumentThe argument reaches the necessary being first

    Reichenbach replies that the first part of the argument already establishes that a necessary being exists, as Smart noted, so the second part only identifies it. The argument also needs only factual necessity, he holds, not the absolute necessity Kant assumed.1

    5From a necessary being to GodThe universe is made only of contingent things, so the necessary being is something other than the universe: God.

    For the argument

    For the argumentThe necessary being would be a purposive agent

    O'Connor argues that the universe cannot be the necessary being, since it is a complex of contingent things, and that a more viable account of a necessary being is as a purposive agent with desires, intentions, and beliefs, a view consistent with identifying it as God. Koons derives further attributes, such as that it is not a mere aggregate and is not essentially located in space or time.1

    Reply, against the argumentGod's attributes cannot be deduced this way

    Oppy, examining Koons's argument, expresses significant skepticism that the properties traditionally given to God can be deduced from a first cause in this way.1

    For the argumentThe necessary being would be all-powerful

    Gale took the argument to reach a very powerful, intelligent creator, short of the all-perfect God. Jerome Gellman argued that such a being would be essentially all-powerful and, if being all-powerful implies knowing everything, all-knowing too, and Gale and Pruss conceded the point.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentMatter and energy could be the necessary being

    Hume's Cleanthes asks why the material universe could not be the necessarily existent being, since we do not know all the qualities of matter. Bede Rundle argues that matter and energy, which persist through every change, exist necessarily and need no cause: their arrangements are contingent, but their existence is not.41

    Reply, for the argumentNecessary matter raises its own problems

    Reichenbach asks whether there could have been more or less matter and energy than there is, and notes that the view depends on conservation holding in the universe's earliest phase, about which little is known. If matter and energy were the necessary being, he adds, everything that follows from them would be necessary too. O'Connor argues that such a view leaves the different kinds of matter unexplained.1

    Against the argumentA necessary being is not yet the God of a religion

    Reichenbach writes that even if the argument succeeds, the difficult task remains of showing that the being it reaches is the God of religion, and if so, of which religion. Kant and Rowe divide the argument into two parts, the second identifying the necessary being as God, and Reichenbach finds it unclear whether that second part belongs to the cosmological argument at all.1

    Where does the argument come from?

    The argument took shape in Arabic philosophy and passed into Christian and then modern European thought. Arabic philosophers, among them Avicenna (Ibn Sina, about 980 to 1037), developed it.1 Thomas Aquinas (about 1225 to 1274) took it up in his Summa Theologiae and his Summa Contra Gentiles.15 Avicenna divided existing things into those necessary in themselves and those only possible in themselves. A possible thing exists only if a cause makes it necessary.6 Since the chain of such causes cannot run on forever, he argued, it ends in a Necessary Existent that has no cause.6

    Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 to 1716) appealed to a strengthened principle of sufficient reason. On his version, no fact is real and no statement true without a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.1 The reason for the whole series of contingent things, he argued, must lie outside it, in a necessary being that we call God.1 Samuel Clarke (1675 to 1729) also built his version of the argument on the principle.1

    The argument came under attack in the eighteenth century, first from David Hume and then from Immanuel Kant.1 In the early twentieth century it was largely set aside outside Thomist circles, the followers of Aquinas.1

    Later in the century it returned. Robert Koons took what he called a new look at the argument in 1997, and Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss built a version on a weak form of the principle in 1999.1 Pruss defended the principle itself in The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (2006).1 Richard Swinburne takes another path. He rejects the principle in the form that leads to a logically necessary being, and argues that the existence of a complex universe raises the probability that God exists.1

    Across traditions

    Arabic philosophers in the Islamic world developed the argument, and Jewish and Christian philosophers took it up and disputed it.17 Hindu and Buddhist philosophers argued in their own terms over whether the world depends on a single cause.18 Latter-day Saint teaching holds that some things were never created, and the philosopher David L. Paulsen draws out what this means for God as the world's explanation.910

    In Buddhism, Vasubandhu (about 400 to 480) argued that the world's diversity cannot be traced to any single source.8 Richard Hayes, who studied the Buddhist arguments against a creator, notes that Vasubandhu himself saw this reasoning as telling against primordial matter as much as against God.8 Vasubandhu also argued that if God needed other causal factors in order to create, he would not really be the cause of the world.8 Calling him creator alongside those factors, Vasubandhu held, would be a mere statement of devotion, since only the other factors are ever seen at work.8

    Dharmakirti (about 600 to 660), as Hayes reconstructs his reasoning, set a dilemma for a permanent creator.8 If something outside God must trigger his power to create, God alone is not enough to explain the world. If he triggers it himself, he acts, and so he changes and is not permanent after all.8

    In Christianity, Aquinas took up the argument in his Third Way, from possibility and necessity.1 It begins with things that come into being and pass away. If everything were like that, Aquinas argues, at one time there could have been nothing, and then there would be nothing now.11

    Aquinas concludes that something exists whose necessity comes from itself, which, he writes, all people speak of as God.11 Aquinas held that the philosophical arguments for God as first cause fit an eternal universe, the Stanford entry notes, though he rejected an eternal universe on the basis of revelation.1 John Duns Scotus argued that even if a series of essentially ordered causes were infinite, the whole series would still depend on some prior cause.1 In such a series, each cause depends on those before it for its power to act.1

    Among Hindu philosophers, the Stanford entry finds a very brief argument from dependence in the Nyayakusumanjali of the Nyaya thinker Udayana.1 Nyaya philosophers, it reports, would admit an endless regress of causes if there were evidence for one. Lacking such evidence, they conclude that God must exist as the cause that depends on nothing.1

    Ramanuja (1017 to 1137 by traditional accounts), a philosopher of the tradition devoted to Vishnu, is known for arguing for bhakti, devotion to a personal God.12 He describes a dependence of a different kind. All individual beings, on his account, are modes of the body of Brahman, the ultimate reality, which stands to them as a soul stands to its body.12 Yet he did not teach creation from nothing: persons and basic qualities are eternal features of Brahman's body, and creation organizes its elements into the cosmos.12

    In Islam, Avicenna's proof of the Necessary Existent in part both echoed and influenced the arguments of kalam, the tradition of reasoned theology.6 In another work, Remarks and Admonitions, he argued that even the whole collection of possible things needs a cause outside it that is necessary in itself.6 Some scholars read these arguments as a priori: proofs that do not rest on experience.6

    Al-Ghazali (about 1056 to 1111) objected to Avicenna's view that this world is the necessary effect of God's nature.13 He held instead that it is the contingent effect of God's free will and his deliberate choice among alternative worlds.13 Theologians of his Ash'arite school held that God is the particularizing agent of all events, who decides when each thing comes into existence and when it passes away.13 Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126 to 1198) judged Avicenna's metaphysical arguments for God short of demonstration and unpersuasive to ordinary people, and preferred an argument from physics.14

    In Judaism, Hasdai Crescas (about 1340 to 1410 or 1411) was a leading rabbi of Aragon and a critic of the Aristotelian philosophy of Maimonides.7 He held that the only way to prove God's existence is from the need for a first cause.7 If everything in the universe is caused, he argued, its existence is merely possible, so a first cause must make it exist rather than not.7

    Crescas rejected Aristotle's denial of an actual infinite.3 Baruch Spinoza later cited him for a version of the proof that holds even if the chain of causes never ends. On that version, things that do not exist by their own nature must be brought to exist by something that does.3

    Latter-day Saint scripture teaches that intelligence, the core of each human soul, was never created and never can be (Doctrine and Covenants 93:29).9 Joseph Smith taught in 1839 that earth, water, and the like existed in an elementary state from eternity.9 In this teaching, the Creation gave order to existing elements rather than bringing the universe out of nothing.9 Writing in BYU Studies, Paulsen holds that because some things are as eternal as God, nothing in Joseph Smith's premises makes God the full, or even the final, explanation of all else.10

    Where does the debate stand?

    Philosophers remain divided over the argument.1 Its recent defenders include Koons, Pruss, Joshua Rasmussen, and Timothy O'Connor.1 Gale, at first a critic of cosmological arguments, later seems to have changed his mind and defended a version of his own.1 Its critics include J. L. Mackie, Graham Oppy, Bede Rundle, Wes Morriston, and Peter van Inwagen.1 The Stanford entry sums up the dividing line. Critics doubt that the principles of causation and sufficient reason apply universally, while defenders generally accept them, at least for contingent things.1

    Shaun Nichols and Justin Steinberg found in experiments that people presuppose something like the principle of sufficient reason when they explain things.1 That, they suggest, might give grounds for thinking the argument intuitive.1 The entry's author, Bruce Reichenbach, concludes that every thesis and argument he considers, for or against the cosmological argument, is seriously contested.1

    Common questions

    What is the argument from contingency?

    It argues that things which could have failed to exist need an explanation of why they exist, that contingent things alone cannot give a complete one, and so that a necessary being exists, one that cannot fail to exist. Defenders identify that being with God. Critics question the premises and the step to God.

    What is the principle of sufficient reason?

    It is the demand that everything have a reason, cause, or ground. The argument from contingency uses a form of it: every contingent thing has a complete explanation. Leibniz relied on a strong version, and Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss built an argument on a weaker one. Hume, J. L. Mackie, and Peter van Inwagen are among its critics.

    Could the universe itself be the necessary being?

    Hume's character Cleanthes asked why the material universe could not be the necessarily existent being, and Bede Rundle argues that matter and energy need no cause. Defenders answer that the universe is made of contingent things and so is contingent too, and Bruce Reichenbach raises problems for the idea that matter and energy exist necessarily.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Bruce Reichenbach. Cosmological Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. Kenneth L. Pearce. Omnipotence. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Martin Lin. Principle of Sufficient Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 9. Hume Texts Online, 1779, Part 9. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Olga Lizzini. Ibn Sina's Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. Shalom Sadik. Hasdai Crescas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024, sections 1 and 2.4. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    8. Richard P. Hayes. Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), pages 5 to 28 (author's copy, University of New Mexico), 1988. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    9. Becoming Like God, Gospel Topics Essays. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.
    10. David L. Paulsen. Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil. BYU Studies 39, number 1, page 53, section "The Logical Problem of Evil". Accessed 2026-11-20.
    11. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 2 (The Existence of God). New Advent (Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation, second revised edition, 1920), 1920, First Part, Question 2, Article 3, with Objection 1 and its reply. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    12. Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    13. Frank Griffel. al-Ghazali. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    14. Fouad Ben Ahmed and Robert Pasnau. Ibn Rushd [Averroes]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.