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    The Existence of God: an argument for God

    Does morality point to God? The moral argument

    The moral argument holds that there are objective moral facts and that God best explains them. Its defenders, from Immanuel Kant to Robert Adams, hold that morality makes best sense if God exists. Its critics answer that morality needs no divine ground, that tying it to God's commands would make it arbitrary, or that evolution explains our moral sense.

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    The argument, step by step

    For the argumentAgainst the argumentWhat both sides accept

    The argument, as its defenders state it:

    1. Premise 1There are objective moral facts.
    2. Premise 2God provides the best explanation of objective moral facts.
    3. ConclusionTherefore, God probably exists.

    1Premise 1There are objective moral facts.

    What both sides acceptAccepting this premise does not by itself favor belief in God. Moral realists, who hold that some moral claims are true in the way factual claims are, include both theists and nontheists, and the argument's defenders can make common cause with nontheist realists against views on which morality is subjective, such as expressivism.12

    For the argument

    For the argumentSome things are wrong whatever anyone thinks

    Defenders share the moral realist's view that what is wrong with slavery is not a matter of taste, preference, or custom. On this view, moral progress makes sense only if there are real standards that people can come to know and get right.1

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentNo moral claims are objectively true

    J. L. Mackie held that moral claims try to state facts but that none of them is true, a view philosophers call an error theory. He also found non-natural moral qualities strange, unlike anything science discovers. Other philosophers, called expressivists, hold that moral claims express attitudes rather than report facts. Mackie and Gilbert Harman also argue that moral facts explain nothing that happens in the world, not even why people hold the moral beliefs they do.12

    Reply, for the argumentSubjective views drain morality of its authority

    Angus Ritchie argues that views on which moral claims express attitudes can explain why people make the moral judgments they do, but empty morality of its objective authority.2

    Reply, against the argumentExpressivists can earn the language of moral truth

    Many philosophers find expressivism and other subjective views attractive. Quasi-realists such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard argue that an expressivist can earn, step by step, all the talk of moral truth and fact that realists use, without giving up the view that moral claims express attitudes.21

    Against the argumentEvolution shaped our moral beliefs for survival, not truth

    Sharon Street argues that natural selection favored whatever moral beliefs helped our ancestors survive and reproduce, so it would be a coincidence if those beliefs matched independent moral truths. Richard Joyce argues that evolution and social history explain our moral beliefs with no appeal to moral truths, so there is no need to posit them.3

    Reply, for the argumentThe problem is unguided evolution

    Evans and Baggett answer that the worry comes from evolution combined with naturalism, the view that nature is all there is. If God guided evolution with the aim of creating moral beings, it would be no accident that human moral beliefs are largely correct. Mark Linville argues that naturalists find it hard to give a plausible evolutionary account of how human moral judgments could be justified.2

    Reply, against the argumentRealists without God have their own answers

    Secular moral realists answer Street without appeal to God. David Enoch argues that the match is no coincidence if what is morally valuable includes the cooperation evolution favored. Others note that minds shaped by evolution also reach truths of physics and mathematics, and William FitzPatrick argues that people can reach moral truths by reasoning, as in other fields.13

    2Premise 2God provides the best explanation of objective moral facts.

    What both sides acceptBoth sides argue by comparison at this step: defenders must show that God explains morality better than the alternatives, and critics offer those alternatives. Philosophers have reached no consensus on what grounds morality: no single theory of it seems to have wide support among philosophers.2

    For the argument

    For the argumentMoral obligations are the commands of a good God

    Robert Adams holds that obligations arise from social relationships, and that humans' relationship to a good and loving God best explains moral obligation. Obligations grounded in that relationship would be objective, would give people reason to comply, and would outrank every other kind of obligation.2

    For the argumentSome atheists agree that objective morality would need God

    Evans and Baggett note that theists can find allies in atheists such as Mackie, who denied objective moral values, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who held that the absence of God undermines traditional Western morality. They take this as a sign that the argument is not plainly circular, since each premise is sometimes accepted by different nonbelievers.2

    For the argumentMoral awareness is more likely if God exists

    Richard Swinburne argues that helping behavior does not require moral beliefs, since many animals help others of their kind without them. A God who wants humans to choose freely between good and evil would have reason to give them moral awareness, so the existence of moral awareness gives theism some support.2

    Against the argument

    Against the argumentThe Euthyphro dilemma

    In Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates asks whether the holy is loved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because the gods love it. Applied to God: if an act is right because God commands it, morality looks arbitrary, since God could have commanded cruelty; if God commands it because it is right, rightness stands apart from God.45

    Reply, for the argumentGod's commands flow from God's good nature

    Adams separates the good from the right. God's nature is the standard of goodness, and God's commands, which always aim at the good, create obligations, so they are neither arbitrary nor answerable to a standard outside God. William Alston adds that any account of goodness must stop somewhere, and stopping at God is no more arbitrary than stopping at a principle.24

    Reply, against the argumentCalling God good already assumes a standard

    Kai Nielsen argues that to know that God is good, a believer must already have a standard of goodness that does not come from God, so morality is independent of God. Wes Morriston, Erik Wielenberg, Graham Oppy, and others press further objections to divine command theories, among them objections about human autonomy and about moral knowledge.42

    Reply, for the argumentDefenders reply to these objections

    Adams answers the autonomy objection: people remain responsible for judging God's goodness for themselves and for understanding and applying God's commands. Evans, Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Matthew Flannagan, and others have published replies to the other objections.42

    Against the argumentBasic moral truths need no foundation

    Wielenberg defends what he calls "godless normative realism": basic moral truths are necessary, fundamental facts that do not depend on God or on anything else.2

    Reply, for the argumentBrute moral facts are stranger without God

    Evans and Baggett answer that Mackie's charge of strangeness may hit brute moral facts even harder than it hits theism, since moral truths may seem less odd in a universe grounded in a person.2

    Reply, against the argumentMoral facts need not be scientific facts

    Non-naturalist moral realists, among them Russ Shafer-Landau and David Enoch, defend objective moral facts that are not natural facts. They reject the idea that science is the measure and test of all things.1

    Against the argumentMoral facts may be part of nature

    Other moral realists, such as Richard Boyd, David Brink, and Peter Railton, argue that moral facts are natural facts or fit with them. Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse ground value in human nature and human flourishing.1

    Reply, for the argumentA natural account must not water morality down

    Evans and Baggett answer that the question is whether a naturalistic account can explain morality without watering down its categories and stripping them of their most interesting features.2

    Against the argumentEvolution can explain the moral sense

    Philip Kitcher proposes that early humans evolved a capacity to follow shared norms, with emotions such as guilt and resentment, because it held cooperative groups together. Cultural change over thousands of years then built that capacity into today's moral systems.3

    3ConclusionTherefore, God probably exists.

    What both sides acceptAs the argument is usually set out, its conclusion is that God probably exists, and each premise is open to challenge: the first from views on which morality is subjective, the second from rival explanations of morality. Most defenders today present arguments like this one as a case for what is probable, not as proofs whose premises no reasonable person could deny.2

    For the argument

    For the argumentOne strand in a wider case

    Swinburne holds that moral awareness on its own gives theism some support, though not very strong evidence, and adds to other evidence in a cumulative case. Evans and Baggett see each version of the argument as setting out the cost of rejecting its conclusion.2

    For the argumentMorality needs a world where goodness can succeed

    Immanuel Kant argued that a moral agent must aim at the highest good, a world where virtue and happiness go together. That aim is reasonable only if nature is ordered to make it reachable, so the agent must believe in God, as a demand of practical reason rather than a proof.2

    Reply, against the argumentThat assumes the world meets our needs

    Peter Byrne argues that such practical arguments assume the world is likely to be organized to meet our deepest needs, a premise likely to be false if there is no God, so the arguments appear circular. Other critics answer that the human condition may simply be tragic or absurd, and that wishing otherwise is no reason to believe.2

    Reply, for the argumentA worldview should explain human life

    Evans and Baggett reply that it is not clear that only believers find Byrne's premise attractive. Humans are part of nature, and a good account of the world should explain important features of human life rather than explain them away.2

    Against the argument

    The sources used give no point here.

    Where does the argument come from?

    The argument grew from an ancient question. Its most influential modern versions are probably those of Immanuel Kant, and philosophers have offered new versions over the last hundred years, with a revival in recent decades.2 In Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates (about 470 to 399 BCE) asks whether the holy is holy because the gods love it, or loved by them because it is holy.5 Thomas Aquinas (about 1225 to 1274) argued, in the fourth of his Five Ways, that because things are more and less good, there must be something best of all, which causes their goodness and which he identified with God.26 Kant (1724 to 1804) held that the theoretical arguments for God fail, but in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) he argued that a moral agent must believe in God as a "postulate of practical reason."25

    Arguments in Kant's line stayed prominent into the twentieth century, in the work of W. R. Sorley (1918), Hastings Rashdall (1920), and A. E. Taylor (1930), and John Henry Newman (1870) argued from conscience.2 C. S. Lewis's Mere Christianity (1952) opens with a moral argument; Evans and Baggett call it almost certainly the best-selling book of apologetics, the reasoned defense of a faith, in the twentieth century.2 In recent decades Philip Quinn and Robert Adams revived divine command theory, the view that moral obligations depend on God's commands. New versions of the argument followed from Adams, John Hare, and Evans, and David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls set out a book-length cumulative version in 2016.2

    Critics answered from several directions. John Stuart Mill argued, in a work published in 1874, that the moral law, unlike human laws, does not come from the will of a lawgiver outside the mind.2 Kai Nielsen's Ethics Without God (1973) argued that morality is logically independent of religion, and Mackie (1977) denied that objective moral values exist at all.42 Muslim and Jewish thinkers had debated a parallel question in the Middle Ages, as the next section describes.5

    Across traditions

    Buddhist and Hindu thinkers gave their own accounts of a moral order, some with God and some without, while Christian, Muslim, and Jewish thinkers each debated whether right and wrong depend on God's command, and Latter-day Saint scripture speaks to how God relates to justice. The sources used for this page record no Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, or Latter-day Saint discussion of the modern moral argument itself.

    Buddhist teachers of more than one school describe a moral order without a creator. The Theravada writer Nyanaponika Thera holds that the basic moral law is inherent in life itself, a case of the law of cause and effect that needs no divine lawgiver.7 The Dalai Lama, whose line is linked with the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, says that for Buddhists there is no creator but the law of causality: harming others brings suffering, and helping them brings happiness.89 The scholars Charles Goodman and Aaron Schultz write that compassion and loving-kindness form the basis of the Buddhist approach to ethics, and that refraining from destructive actions is a very important means to freedom from suffering.10 Many Buddhists have also been moved to vow to keep rules of moral discipline by a wish to avoid the karmic results of harming others, results traditionally understood largely in terms of rebirth.10 Goodman and Schultz add that it is not clear that Buddhist thinkers have a concept of moral obligation at all, the concept on which Adams's version of the argument rests.102

    Christian thinkers divided over whether right and wrong depend on God's will. Aquinas taught that natural law is humanity's share in God's eternal law, grasped through practical reason, and the Counter-Reformation made his synthesis authoritative in Roman Catholic education.5 William of Ockham (died 1349) held that theft and adultery would be obligatory if God commanded them, though Adams reads this as a bare logical possibility that God's character rules out.45 The Protestant Reformers Martin Luther (1483 to 1546) and John Calvin (1509 to 1564) held that what God wills is right because God wills it.5 Calvin added, in the same section of his Institutes, that God is not lawless: God's will is free from every fault and is itself the highest standard of perfection.11

    Hindu thinkers discuss right action as dharma, duty or morality, and the orthodox schools hold that the Veda is the primary source of knowledge of it.12 The schools divided over whether the Veda depends on God. Mimamsa, the school that defended the Veda's authority, held that its words were never composed by anyone, and the Stanford entry on Indian epistemology calls Mimamsa atheistic.13 Almost all philosophers of Nyaya, the school that defended Hindu theism by reason, and most theists of Vedanta held instead that the Lord is the Veda's author.1314 The Vaishnava philosopher Ramanuja (1017 to 1137 by traditional accounts), of the devotional tradition that worships Vishnu as supreme, appears to have presumed that morality is valuable in itself, and tied God's own worth to God's moral excellence. On his account, dharma is not simply a law imposed from outside but the best way for each being to act, given its nature, though people cannot know it without scripture.1215

    Some Hindu philosophers also linked God to karma, the principle by which actions bear fruit. The Nyaya philosopher Uddyotakara argued that karma, like atoms and primordial matter, is unconscious, and so works only when a conscious agent directs it, as an axe cuts only in someone's hand.14 Buddhist, Mimamsa, and later Jain philosophers rejected Nyaya's arguments for God.14

    In Islam, the question divided the medieval schools of theology that the Stanford entry places within Sunni thought. The Mu'tazilite theologians, whose ethics the theologian 'Abd al-Jabbar (died 1025) developed most fully, held that reason can know right and wrong apart from revelation, and that these standards bind God as well.516 Al-Ash'ari (died 935 or 936), who began as a Mu'tazilite, held instead that God sets the standard of right and wrong and is bound by none.516 Al-Maturidi (died 944) took a middle path: humans have some sense of good and bad, but their judgments are frail, so revelation is needed to set them on firm ground.516 To the charge that this makes morality arbitrary, Ash'arite theologians such as al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali answered that what God could do is not what God does, and that God confirms in revelation that he rewards good actions.16 Among Twelver Shia Muslims, who accept a line of twelve imams, thinkers began to use some Mu'tazilite teachings in the ninth century. Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes that Twelver Shiism differs from Sunni Islam in stressing that justice is innate in God's nature, and it counts God's justice among its principles of religion.17

    Jewish thinkers drew a related distinction: Saadia Gaon (882 to 942) divided the commandments into laws of reason, such as the bans on murder and theft, whose reasons human reason can work out, and laws of revelation, such as the food laws, on which reason alone passes no judgment.18 Maimonides (1138 to 1204) taught that humans have some access to right and wrong by reason, but that what makes keeping these standards obligatory is God's revelation.519

    In Latter-day Saint scripture, the Book of Mormon teaches that mercy cannot override the demands of justice, since if justice were set aside, God would no longer be God (Alma 42:13, 25).20 The philosopher David L. Paulsen, writing in BYU Studies, reads Joseph Smith as teaching, contrary to classical Christian thought, that certain lawlike principles, along with matter and intelligences, are as eternal as God.21

    Where does the debate stand?

    Philosophers remain divided over the argument, and its defenders present it as a case for what is probable, not a proof.2 Its defenders in recent decades include Adams, Hare, Evans, Baggett and Walls, Linville, and Ritchie, and William Lane Craig argues that a morality grounded in God gives people a reason to be moral, since God holds them accountable.24 Its critics reject it for different reasons. Wielenberg defends objective morality without appeal to God, while Street argues against moral realism itself and Joyce argues that evolution supports moral skepticism.213

    The argument is about what grounds morality, not about who behaves well. Its defenders hold that people can know their moral obligations without believing in God: on Evans and Baggett's account, a person may be aware of God's commands without knowing them as God's.2 Michael Austin, writing on divine command theory, adds that its defenders can grant that a naturalist may come to see by reason that doing good to others is good in itself.4 Secular moral realists such as Wielenberg, for their part, hold that basic moral truths do not depend on God.2

    Common questions

    What is the moral argument for God?

    It argues that there are objective moral facts, things that are right or wrong whatever anyone thinks, and that God is their best explanation, so God probably exists. Defenders such as Robert Adams ground moral obligation in the commands of a good God. Critics deny that there are objective moral facts, or explain them without God.

    What is the Euthyphro dilemma?

    It comes from Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. Put to God, it asks whether an act is right because God commands it, making morality look arbitrary, or commanded because it is right, making rightness independent of God. Robert Adams answers that God's commands flow from God's good nature. Kai Nielsen argues that calling God good assumes a standard of goodness outside God.

    Does the moral argument say that atheists cannot be good?

    No. The argument is about what grounds morality, not about who behaves well. Its defenders hold that people can know their moral obligations without believing in God: on one account, a person can be aware of God's commands without knowing them as God's. Secular moral realists such as Erik Wielenberg hold that basic moral truths do not depend on God.

    Read next

    Sources

    1. Geoff Sayre-McCord. Moral Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2026. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    2. C. Stephen Evans and David Baggett. Moral Arguments for the Existence of God. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    3. William FitzPatrick. Morality and Evolutionary Biology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    4. Michael W. Austin. Divine Command Theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    5. John Hare and Jennifer Herdt. Religion and Morality in Western Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    6. Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    7. Nyanaponika Thera. Buddhism and the God-idea. Buddhist Publication Society, via Access to Insight, 1994, opening paragraphs. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    8. Frank E. Reynolds and Charles Hallisey. Buddhism: An Overview. Encyclopedia of Religion (Macmillan Reference USA), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987, introduction; "Buddhism as Pan-Asian Civilization"; "Buddhism as Cultural Religion". Accessed 2026-10-28.
    9. Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Empowerment and Teaching at Shillong Polo Ground. dalailama.com, 2014. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    10. Charles Goodman and Aaron Schultz. Ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    11. John Calvin. Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book III, Chapter 23. Christian Classics Ethereal Library (translator not named on the saved page), Book III, Chapter 23, section 2. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    12. Shyam Ranganathan. Ramanuja. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    13. Stephen Phillips and Anand Vaidya. Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024, section 6, Testimony. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    14. Matthew R. Dasti. Nyaya. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, introduction and section 3. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    15. John B. Carman. Bhakti. Encyclopedia of Religion (Gale), via Encyclopedia.com, 1987. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    16. Jon McGinnis and Rahim Acar. Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2023. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    17. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Shiism: Ithna Ashariyah. Encyclopedia of Religion (1987, revised 2005), via Encyclopedia.com, 2005. Accessed 2026-10-29.
    18. Sarah Pessin. Saadya [Saadiah]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003, sections 1, 2, 3, and 9. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    19. Kenneth Seeskin. Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024. Accessed 2026-11-20.
    20. The Book of Mormon (1920 edition), the Doctrine and Covenants and the Pearl of Great Price (1921 editions). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1920. Accessed 2026-10-28.
    21. David L. Paulsen. Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil. BYU Studies 39, number 1, page 53, section "The Logical Problem of Evil". Accessed 2026-11-20.